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Robbery, a felony of the First Degree with a firearms
enhancement; Aggravated Assault, a felony of the Third Degree;
Theft a felony of the Second Degree; and of being a Habitual
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District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

(1)

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

refusing to suppress the in-court identifications of the
State's witnesses?
(2)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by

refusing to give Appellant's requested jury Instruction
concerning eyewitness identification?
(3)

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

instructing the jury with regard to inferences which might be
drawn from unexplained possession of recently stolen property?
(4) Was the Appellant improperly convicted of both a
greater and lesser, included offense?
(5) Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a
conviction?
(6)

Did the trial court err in denying the

Appellant's Motion to Dismiss the Habitual Criminal Charge?
(7)

Did the cumulative effect of the errors prevent

the Appellant from receiving a fair trial?

-viii-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH,

Case No. 20557
Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction
against Paul Anthony Branch for Aggravated Robbery with a
firearms enhancement under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as
amended) and Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as amended);
Aggravated Assault, a felony of the third degree under Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended); and of being a Habitual
Criminal under Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended).

A

jury found Mr. Branch guilty following a trial held from
January 14-25, 1985, on all charges except that of being a
Habitual Criminal, in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H.
Russon, Judge, presiding.

The Habitual Criminal charge was

tried to the Judge on February 25, 1985.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Statement of Facts
On August 18, 1984, at approximately 5:15 p.m., (R.
473), two men entered the Oakwood Jewelry Store located at 7200
South and 2200 East, in the Hillside Plaza, Salt Lake County,
Utah (R. 472,590).

The first man encountered the only employee

in the store, Joanne Knaphus, and forced her at gunpoint into a
restroom at the rear of the store (R. 616-618).

At trial, the

employee was unable to identify Mr. Branch as being one of the
robbers (R. 625,642-644).
A female customer, Stella Kyarsgaard, then entered the
jewelry store and was escorted by the second man to the
restroom area where she joined the store employee (R.
1210-1217).

While the first man guarded the two women the

second man swept the jewelry display cases of their contents
(R. 492), valued in excess of $110,000.00 (R. 975). After
warning the two women to remain in the restroom for a period of
time, the two men left the store (R. 1223-1224).
A third woman, Marsha Wright, and her thirteen year
old daughter, Misty, parked north of the jewelry store, noticed
two men coming from the establishment carrying a large garbage
bag (R. 1077-1080).

The two men quickly got in a nearby car

occupied by a third man and a woman and left the scene (R.
1085-1088).
On August 24, 1984, at approximately 2:30 p.m. (R,
310-311), two Los Angeles Police Department Officers, traveling
in an unmarked police car, (R. 311), entered the parking lot of
the Pink Motel
located near the predominantly Hispanic city of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Pacoima, California, (R. 1025), on a routine patrol (R. 311).
The officers observed several people moving about the parking
lot (R. 931-932) and then noticed Raymond Johnson, a male
Hispanic, seated in his beige Chevrolet automobile operating
hydraulic lifts, which are illegal in California (R. 312-314).
The officers then observed a female Hispanic, Jeanna Salazar,
exit room ten of the Pink Motel and enter Raymond Johnson's
vehicle (R. 313).
After maneuvering their car into the parking lot the
officers observed two other Hispanic individuals, David Allen
Johnson, brother of Raymond, and Teresa Alvarez inside room ten
of the motel (R. 315-316).

David Allen Johnson appeared to be

giving himself an intravenous injection (R. 318). After
further observation of the four individuals, officers placed
them under arrest for being under the influence of opiates (R.
324-327).
The officers then conducted a search of Raymond
Johnson's car and room ten of the Pink Motel, which was
registered under the name of Teresa Alvarez (R. 348-349).

The

search uncovered large amounts of jewelry stolen from the
Oakwood Jewelry Store in addition to personal belongings and
identification of persons other than the four arrested
individuals, although no property or identification of Paul
Branch was located (R. 957).
Further investigation by the Los Angeles Police
Department revealed that additional jewelry taken in the
Oakwood robbery
had
at J.the
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Exchange in North Hollywood, California (R. 778). A photo
spread was then prepared which included a picture of Joey
Miera, half brother of Appellant Paul Branch, which was
confiscated from room ten of the Pink Motel (R. 955-957).

The

spread was shown to Isreal Babich, proprietor of the pawn shop,
who selected the photograph of Joey Miera as possibly being one
of the persons who pawned the stolen jewelry (R. 958).
Although the picture picked in the photo spread by Mr.
Babich had been found in a suitcase along with identification
and correspondence belonging to Joey Miera (R. 946-957), Salt
Lake County officers who were sent a copy of the photograph
misidentified the person therein as being the Appellant, Paul
Anthony Branch.

A criminal warrant for aggravated robbery was

then issued in Mr. Branch's name (R. 1396).
On September 16, 1984, Officer David Madsen of the
Salt Lake City Police Department stopped a vehicle driven by
Appellant Paul Branch for traveling at an excessive rate of
speed (R. 1398).

Mr. Branch was subsequently arrested on the

outstanding warrant (R. 1396-1398) and booked in the county
jail (R. 1395).

An inventory of Mr. Branch's property revealed

that he held no jewelry and no driver's license and that he
held only twelve cents (R. 1397-1398).
Three defendants, brothers Raymond Jeffrey and Alan
David Johnson, and Appellant Paul Anthony Branch were then
jointly tried in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge,
presiding.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to suppress in-court identifications by each and every State
witness since previous identifications were inconsistent and
unreliable (R. 472-538) After hearing argument on the motion,
the trial court denied the request, allowing the State's
witnesses to testify at trial (R. 442,557-558).
Following completion of the defense, the Appellant
again moved the court to exclude or strike eyewitness
identifications of Appellant as being unreliable (R. 1581).
This motion was based in part on the unreliable pre-trial and
preliminary hearing identifications of the assailants by Ms.
Stella Kyarsgaard, coupled with her trial testimony that Allen
David Johnson, codefendant, was the man she saw at the jewelry
store robbery and not the Appellant, an identification then
recanted (R. 1581).

These in-trial identifications were in

complete conflict with the woman's earlier descriptions and
with her claims at the preliminary hearing (R. 1207-1242).

The

motion was again denied (R. 1618-1619).
Defendants also submitted pre-trial motions to sever
the cases (R. 572-578) and to dismiss charges of Theft and
Aggravated Assault as they were lesser included offenses of
Aggravated Robbery (R. 302-303,558-561).

Both motions were

denied (R. 583).
During the trial a Motion in Limine was submitted by
the defendants to exclude any testimony with regard to the
discovery of marijuana, syringes and other paraphernalia seized
at the Pink Motel (R. 686-691).

However, without regard to the

by the Howard
W.
Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben
Law School, BYU. elicited
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testimony which referred to the seizure of sponges and syringes
(R. 772). Because of this, counsel for the Appellant
subsequently moved for a mistrial which was denied (R. 797-798).
In addition, the Appellant presented the jury with an
alibi witness.

The record reveals that Ms. Ruby Archuletta,

Aunt to Mr. Branch, testified that he man was with her on the
day of the robbery (R. 1370-94).
Following the trial to the jury, the Appellant and
Raymond Johnson were found guilty on all charges (R.
1694-1697).

Defendant Branch was also found guilty of being a

Habitual Criminal (R. 1757).

He was sentenced five years to

life for the Aggravated Robbery conviction, one to fifteen
years for Theft, one to fifteen years for being a Habitual
Criminal and zero to five years for Aggravated Assault (R.
1783), all terms to run concurrently except for an additional
year for a firearms enhancement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Paul Branch, the Appellant, first contends that the
trial court erred in refusing to suppress identifications of
him by prosecution witnesses.

The identifications were

unreliable and inconsistent with previous identifications by
the same and other witnesses.

For example, Officer James

Penrod initially identified a photograph of a man other than
Mr. Branch as being Mr. Branch.

Another prosecution witness,

Stella Kyarsgaard identified another codefendant at trial and
- 6

-
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then, after a recess, changed her testimony and identified Mr.
Branch.

Such tenuous identifications should have never been

allowed.
The appellant next asserts that the trial court erred
in refusing to give a requested instruction on eyewitness
identification.

In light of the tenuous identifications of the

defendant, the court abused its discretion in refusing such an
instruction.
Next, the Appellant alleges that the trial court erred
in giving Jury Instruction No. 19.

That instruction deprived

him of his right to remain silent and shifted the burden of
proof from the state to the defense.
The Appellant claims that he was improperly charged
and convicted of both greater and lesser offenses.

Two

offenses, theft and aggravated assault, should have been merged
into the offense of aggravated robbery.
Further, Mr. Branch contests his conviction for being
a Habitual Criminal.

During the habitual criminal proceeding

the state failed to show that his previous convictions were
constitutionally valid.
The Appellant argues that the evidence presented was
insufficient to sustain his conviction.

The evidence was not

only inconclusive with respect to Mr. Branch but tended to
incriminate another person.
Finally, Mr. Branch contends that the cumulative
effect of the multitude of errors in this case deprived him of
a fair trial.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
SUPPRESS IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS OF
THE DEFENDANT BY STATE WITNESSES.
Prior to trial the Appellant, Paul Branch, submitted a
motion to the trial court to suppress in-court identifications
by all witnesses for the State (R. 49, 434-434,472) (See
Addendum A ) . Included as part of the motion was a request to
prevent testimony relating to prior identifications (R.
478-479).

The basis of the motion was that prior

identifications of the Appellant by state witnesses were so
unreliable as to render them excludable under Rule 403 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).
At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel provided
the trial court with police reports in which descriptions were
given of the assailant subsequently identified at trial as
Appellant, copies of each of two preliminary hearings and a
summary of the discrepancies in the witness1 statements (R.
476-477).

After hearing argument (R. 472-494) the motion was

denied (R. 539).
Beginning with the landmark decisions in U.S. v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); the United
States Supreme Court attempted to establish effective
safeguards governing the admission of eyewitness evidence of
identification in federal and state criminal trials.
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yet one which the Wade Court described as especially riddled
with enumerable dangers that might seriously, even crucially
derogate from a fair trial.

In a departure from precedent,

unusual even for a case developing constitutional safeguards,
the Court discussed in Wade the dangers inherent in eyewitness
identification:
"The influence of improper suggestion upon
identifying witnesses probably accounts for
more miscarriages of justice than any other
single factor—perhaps it is responsible for
more such errors than all other factors
combined."
Id. at 229 (quoting P.Wall, Eyewitness Identification in
Criminal Cases (1965)).
The unreliability of eyewitness identification has
been well documented in both law review articles^ and court
cases.2

The commentators note that reasons for this

ipid Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L.
Rev. 969 (1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978);
Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No.
Ky.L.Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental
Studies of Face Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977);
Use of Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials,
21 Crim. L.Q. 361 (1979); Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979);
Public Defender Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976);
Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony (1979);
Buckhout, Determinants of Eyewitness Performance on a Lineup,
1974 Bull. Psychonomic Socfy. 191; Buckhout, Eyewitness
Identification and Psychology in the Courtroom, Crim. Def.,
Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 5-9; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony,
Scientific Am., Dec. 1974, at 23; Levme & Tapp, The Psychology
of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U.
Pa. L.Rev. 1079 (1973); Luce, The Neglected Dimension in
Eyewitness Identification, Crim. Def., May-June 1977 at 5-8;
Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibility: Adjusting the
Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 563, 575-85 (1976).
2

For example, a 1979 unreported prosecution in Wilmington,
Delaware, against Reverand Bernard Pagan who was accused of
robbing six Delaware stores during the winter of 1978. At the
trial he was falsely identified by several state witnesses as
the robber. The charges were dismissed after another man, the
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unreliability are found in the problems that are associated
with human perception and memory, both of which play a vital
role in eyewitness identification.

As this Court noted in

State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1972):
"We recognize that caution must be observed
to see that injustice does not result from
the use of methods which unfairly focus
attention upon a particular suspect to
influence the witnesses in their identification."
While the Appellant concedes that police officers
should not be unduly hampered in legitimate attempts to
investigate crimes and to identify those who have committed
them, extreme caution should prevail when identifications
appear to be unreliable.

This is because, as the Kansas

Supreme Court noted in State v. Warren, Supra:
The trouble is that many judges have
assumed that an "eyeball" witness, who
identifies the accused as the criminal,
is the most reliable of witnesses, and
if there are any questions about the
identification, the jurors, in their
wisdom, are fully capable of determining
the credibility of the witness without
special instructions from the court.
Yet cases of mistaken identification
are not infrequent and the problem of
misidentification has not been alleviated.
J[d. at 1241.3
Yet, in spite of the great volume of literature on the
subject of eyewitness testimony the courts in this country have
been slow to take the problem seriously.
Identification:

Sobel, Eyewitness

Legal and Practical Problems, (1985).

Beginning, however, with the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy of

3
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cases, courts have declared that where unreliable or unduly
suggestive identifications are considered in trials, the
defendants thereby prejudiced are denied due process of law.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); State v. Wellstein, 501
P.2d 1084 (Utah 1972) .
The United States Supreme Court finally espoused
standards to be followed in determining the admissibility of
eyewitness identification at trial in Neil v. Biggers, Supra.
Biggers concerned a respondent who had been convicted in a
Tennessee court of rape, on evidence consisting in part of the
victim's visual and voice identification of Biggers at a
stationhouse showup seven months after the crime.

The victim

had been in her assailant's presence for some time and had
directly observed him indoors and under a full moon outdoors.
She testified that she had "no doubt" that Biggers was her
assailant.

She previously had given the police a description

of the assailant and she made no identification of others
presented at previous showups, lineups, or photo spreads.
In a federal habeas proceeding, the District Court
held that the stationhouse confrontation was so suggestive as
to violate due process and the Court of Appeals affirmed at 448
F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1971).

The Supreme Court reversed and held

that the evidence properly had been allowed to go to the jury
409 U.S. at 198.
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The United States Supreme Court, however, expressed
concern about the lapse of seven months between the crime and
the confrontation and observed that "this would be a seriously
negative factor in most cases."

Ijd. at 201. The "central

question," however, was "whether under the 'totality of the
circumstances1 the identification was reliable."

rd. at 199;

Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
The factors listed by the court to be considered in
evaluating the likelihood of misidentification included (1) the
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2)
the witness1 degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the
witness1 prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and
(5) the length of the time between the crime and the
confrontation,

rd. at 199.

The admission of testimony with a

substantial likelihood of misidentification warrants reversal
of a conviction, Ij3. at 198.

See also:

Simmons v. United

States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d
353 (Utah 1980) .
A. THE IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF
OFFICER PENROD WAS UNRELIABLE AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED.
At trial, Officer James Penrod of the Los Angeles
Police Department was allowed to identify the Appellant Branch
as a Hispanic man who was observed walking across the parking
lot of the Pink Motel just prior to the arrest of the Johnson
brothers and the recovery of stolen jewelry (R. 696). The
Officer's view
of the man claimed to be the Appellant took
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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place as the officer drove by him on a routine patrol (R.
311).

The policeman's attention was not focused on the man as

there was no evidence then available which indicated illegal
activity was taking place and the view took place only for a
matter of seconds (R. 953-955).

Officer Penrod later

identified a photograph of Joey Miera as the man he passed in
the parking lot, an identification later retracted (R.
953-955), even though officer Penrod admitted that the police
investigation at the Pink Motel revealed no independent
evidence that Paul Branch was ever present there (R. 954-957).
Because of the circumstances surrounding the identification of
Mr. Branch as the man walking in the Pink Motel parking lot by
Officer Penrod, his testimony should have been excluded.4
The witness1 opportunity for observation is the first
standard of the Biggers test for admissibility and the factor
most frequently mentioned in such cases.

Sobel, supra. A

crime of long duration affords a witness or victim a good
opportunity to observe and retain the image of the perpetrator
while a brief view generally does not.

Where the witness has

had only a few seconds to observe the criminal, the opportunity
to view has been deemed inadequate.

Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d

108 (2nd Cir. 1978)(four eyewitnesses to the fatal shooting of
bartender during robbery had only a few seconds to observe
gunman before scrambling for cover); State v. Commeau, 409 A.2d

4
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247 (Me. 1979)(for only a few seconds witness saw robber
running out of store); Rustin v. State, 415 A.2d 631 (Md. App.
1980)(witness viewed suspect for not more than five to ten
seconds).

In the instant case one can hardly say Officer

Penrod viewed the suspect for an adequate period.

Here Officer

Penrod viewed the suspect for an inadequate period.

While

witnesses to other crimes may spend considerable time with the
perpetrator, here Officer Penrod only viewed this person in
passing, completely unaware of any possible wrongful acts.
A second factor in determining reliability of an
identification is the presence or absence of circumstances
likely to attract attention to the perpetrator.

,

For example,

many courts have noted that rape victims are not casual,
inattentive observers, but are likely to pay close attention to
the assailant.
Ark. 1983).

Wicks v. Lockhart, 569 F. Supp. 549, 554 (E.D.

In Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), the

United States Supreme Court considered the reliability of an
eyewitness who was an undercover narcotics agent in the process
of making a drug purchase.

Under these circumstances the

witness was deemed likely to be paying close attention to the
suspect's appearance.

Id.

at 114-115.

Here, however, there was clearly no behavior which
could have attracted the attention of Officer Penrod to the man
in the parking lot.

Penrod was on a routine patrol which was

frequently run on a daily basis (R. 311-312).

The regular

patrol certainly involved passing hundreds of individuals,
making it unlikely that Penrod would notice but a few people
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any arrest warrant for a man resembling the Appellant (R.
311-312,930-931).
Furthermore, the unreliability of Penrod's
identification is enhanced by the fact that his attention as he
entered the Pink Motel parking lot was focused on the car owned
by Raymond Johnson.

Johnson was in his car operating newly

acquired hydraulic lifters, illegal in the state of California
(R. 314). The fact that Penrod further investigated the
"suspicious" behavior of Raymond Johnson, ignoring the person
walking across the parking lot, clouds the reliability of the
identification of the latter.
An analysis of Penrod's field notes and police report
also reveals that the officer made no notations regarding the
man in the parking lot (R. 931), and the man was never stopped
for questioning.

Given the limited glance that Penrod gave the

suspect as they passed and the complete absence of any
noticeable behavior by the man one must question the
reliability of the identification of that man as Paul Branch.
Still, the Appellant readily admits that if an
eyewitness is able to give a detailed, accurate description of
the alleged perpetrator, such a description would support
reliability.

The accuracy of the witness1 description is the

third step in the Biggers reliability test.

An in-court

identification of a defendant which does not match in
substantial respects the description given at the scene or
shortly thereafter indicates the witness did not have a clear
image of the perpetrator.
(1970).

See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
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As earlier indicated, Officer Penrod made no notations
with regard to the person alleged to be Paul Branch (R. 931).
In fact, Penrod made no mention of the suspect in question
Even then Penrodfs

until several hours after the men passed.

identification was of a man named Joey Miera, not the Appellant
(R. 951-955).

It was not until a few days before trial that

Penrod recanted his earlier identification, six months after
the men passed each other at the Pink Motel (R. 955).
Both Biggers and Braithwaite list the witness's level
of certainty at the confrontation as a factor of reliability.
409 U.S. at 199; and 432 U.S. at 114. However, it has become
so common for a witness to express confidence in his own
opinion that this factor is usually just one of many supporting
an identification, but it is rarely determinative.

See People

v. Weller, 679 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1984); State v. Newman, 688
P.2d 180 (Ariz. 1984).

Even experienced judges understand that

the most positive witness is not always the most reliable.
United States v. Johnson, 452 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Here, however, the record is inconclusive as to
Penrod's level of certainty.

He admits that his view of Branch

in the courtroom was his first encounter with the Appellant
since they allegedly passed in the motel parking lot (R.
953-955), six months earlier.

In addition, Penrod admits that

Joey Miera, the man first identified by the officer, resembles
the Appellant (R. 953). (See Addendum B ) .
could only leave doubt in Penrod's mind.

Such an admission

Was the man walking

in the Pink Motel parking lot really Paul Branch or was it Joey
by the Howard W.
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Further, Penrod's certainty of identification is
clouded by the fact that he looked at several pictures of Joey
Miera when later searching room ten of the Pink Motel.

Courts

have unanimously held suspect situations where a witness only
views photographs of one individual.
S.W.2d 151,153 (Mo. App. 1980).

State v. Johnson, 605

Penrod's viewing of Miera here

is "one of the most suggestive photographic identification
procedures that can be used." Sobel, supra.
The final factor considered in Biggers as to
reliability is the time interval between the crime and the
identification.

In Biggers, the showup was held reliable even

though seven months had elapsed between the rape and the
confrontation.

This was because there was much supporting

indicia of reliability.

409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972).

Here, however, almost all circumstantial evidence
presented at trial support Penrod's earlier identification of
Joey Miera rather than the Appellant.

Codefendant David Alan

Johnson testified under oath that Miera had brought the stolen
jewelry with him (R. 1475).

Johnson further testified that the

Appellant did not travel with him to California (R. 1469) nor
was Branch ever seen in the state (R. 1491).
In addition, Johnson testified that Joey Miera had
actually spent a night in room ten of the motel (R. 1491) and,
indeed, clothing, letters and pictures owned by Miera were
found in the room (R, 1582-1583).

Finally, Johnson indicated

that he saw Miera, not Paul Branch, just before being arrested
(R. 1486).
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Also independently conflicting evidence of the
identification is present in the selection of Miera's
photograph as one of the men who sold the jewelry by Israel
Babich, proprietor of the Valley Gold and Silver Exchange (R.
956).

When Babich confronted the Appellant Branch at trial

instead of Miera, no identification could be made (R.
1329,1343,1350,1363).
Thus, a view of the factors listed in Biggers to
determine reliability clearly shows Penrod's in-court
identification should have been excluded.

The encounter at the

Pink Motel was brief and of no consequence until after the
officer saw suggestive pictures several hours later.

The

unidentified man in the parking lot did nothing to attract
Penrod's attention, was never questioned or associated with
those arrested, and was never seen again.

In addition, all

other evidence, including the identification of Miera as the
man in the parking lot by two persons, question Penrod's
testimony.

Under such tenuous circumstances the identification

of the Appellant by Officer Penrod should never have been
allowed.
B. THE IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF
STELLA KYARSGAARD WAS UNRELIABLE AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED.
In addition to the exclusion of Officer Penrod's
testimony, the trial court also erred in not omitting the
identification testimony of Stella Kyarsgaard , an eyewitness
to the Oakwood Jewelry burglary.

Prior to trial defense
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identification of Mr. Branch because it was unreliable (R.
515).

The motion was based upon discrepancies in certain

statements made by the witness to the police officers and later
at the preliminary hearing.

(See Addendum C ) . The motion was

denied and Ms. Kyarsgaard was allowed to testify (R.
442,557-558).
The record reveals that Ms. Kyarsgaard worked at a
business near the Oakwood Jewelry Store (R. 1207-1208) and had
gone to Oakwoodfs to pick up some rings which were being
cleaned (R. 1210).

As she entered the store, Ms. Kyarsgaard

testified she saw a man taller than herself dressed in a blue
jumpsuit with a baseball cap pulled over his head and wearing
dark sunglasses (R. 1212-1213).

He was not looking at Ms.

Kyarsgaard, but rather was peering into a glass display case
which contained numerous items of jewelry (R. 1212).
Unaware that she was happening upon a robbery, Ms.
Kyarsgaard inquired about her rings.

At this point the man

shouted "Bob" to a second man who was apparently in the rear
section of the store (R. 1213).

Thinking the man was calling

the store owner, also named Bob, Ms. Kyarsgaard testified she
voluntarily went to the rear of the store (R. 1213-1214).
As she began to enter the rear of the jewelry store,
Ms. Kyarsgaard testified she was pushed from behind by the man
in the front area into the rear where a second man, armed with
a gun, escorted her to a bathroom where she remained for the
course of the robbery (R. 1215-1217).

When asked to identify
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stated she never saw the man's face and could only estimate his
height (R. 1220-1221).
When asked at trial to identify the first man in the
front of the store, Ms. Kyarsgaard readily pointed to the
codefendant, David Alan Johnson, (R. 1212) and described for
the court what Mr. Johnson was wearing.

After a brief recess

however, Ms. Kyarsgaard returned to the witness stand, recanted
her identification of Mr. Johnson and identified the Appellant,
Paul Branch, as the man in the front of the jewelry store (R.
1226-1228).
other.

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Branch do not resemble each

Johnson is 5fll" with medium build while Branch is 5'4"

with a slight build (R. 1233-1237).
At the close of the defense case, the Appellant again
moved the court to exclude the identification testimony as
being unreliable (R. 1581).

An analysis of the circumstances

surrounding the robbery reveals that under Biggers, the
identification testimony should have been excluded.
As discussed earlier, the first factor to consider in
determining the reliability of Ms. Kyarsgaard's identification
is the length of time she viewed the suspect.

The longer the

viewing the more reliable the identification.

Yet here the

record clearly reveals that Ms. Kyarsgaard only spent a few
seconds with the suspect as she was entering the jewelry store
(R. 1211-1215).

In fact, the two individuals1 contact was so

brief that there was only time for a single verbal exchange
between them (R, 1213-1214)
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At the preliminary hearing Ms. Kyarsgaard originally
estimated that her contact with the man in the front of the
store lasted for several minutes.

(Addendum C at 160-161).

However, under cross examination she admitted that, in reality,
the contact had only been for a matter of seconds.

(Addendum C

at 161). Under such a situation, Ms. Kyarsgaard's
identification should clearly be viewed with suspicion. See
Jackson v. Fogg, supra; State v. Commeau, supra.
In Wood v. State, 713 P.2d 1046 (Okla. Crim. App.
1986) the Oklahoma Court of Appeals considered the
admissibility of identification testimony from a victim who
viewed his assailants for a brief period.

As in the present

case the victim testified he was certain of his attacker's
identity.

Yet, due to general discrepancies in the victim's

statements the court held that:

"[T]he trial court should have granted
appellant's demurrer to the evidence at the
close of the State's case. The victim's only
opportunity to observe his assailant was at
the crime scene. He had only a few seconds to
observe both attackers when he looked over his
shoulder and saw them ten feet away running
towards him. Even in that brief space of time
the victim admitted his attention was split
between the man who hit him and the other assailant
who he had noticed at the door of the arcade.
J^d. at 1047.
The second factor to consider is the degree of
attention focused on the suspect.

Are there circumstances

surrounding the viewing which would make the suspect noticeable
to the eyewitness?

If so, the identification is held to be

more reliable,
Manson v. Brathwaite, supra.
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Here, the Appellant concedes that the clothing worn by
the suspect was unusual for a normal store employee. Yet,
given that the jewelry store was preparing to move to a new
location the suspect might easily have been mistaken for a
mover.

Indeed, such a theory was advanced by another witness

for the state who observed the two men enter the jewelry store
(R. 1152).

u

Regardless of the suspect's clothing however, Ms.
Kyarsgaard testified that she was not aware of the crime until
after she viewed the suspect and began to enter the rear of the
store.

The record reveals that Ms. Kyarsgaard entered the

store and inquired about her rings.

Then the following

occurred:

Q. (by the State) He yelled Bob?
A. Uh huh, I thought he did, yeah.
Q. And you said, "Never mind, I will
do it?"
A. "I will go back."
Q. Will you draw a dotted line along
the route where you walked.
A . I walked up here and I got here
and I thought something is not right...
Q. What occurred when you got to the
point ... where you thought something
was not right? What was it that made
you think something was not right?
A. I don't know. Nobody came out to
say hello to me, like Bob would or Joanne P ;
would.
(R. 1215).
Thus, the record shows that Ms. Kyarsgaard thought
nothing was unusual until after she viewed the suspect.

She
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Indeed, had Ms. Kyarsgaard become aware that she had stumbled
upon a robbery she would have hardly walked up to the suspect
to inquire about her rings or volunteered to enter the rear of
the store.
The Appellant concedes that from the point where Ms.
Kyarsgaard became "suspicious" her testimony would be more
reliable.

As outlined in Biggers, once Ms. Kyarsgaard knew of

the robbery her attention would focus on the men in a way that
a casual viewer would not.

Yet, the testimony reveals that Ms.

Kyarsgaard never again viewed the man in front.

He pushed her

to the rear of the store from behind, and she never again saw
his face (R. 1215-1216).

(Addendum C at 160-161).

The third factor to consider here is the accuracy of
prior descriptions given by Ms. Kyarsgaard of the suspect.
While the witness was able to tentatively identify the
Appellant in a photographic display several weeks following the
robbery, such identification is not dispositive of the issue.
Several variations in Ms. Kyarsgaard's identifications cloud
the credibility of her testimony.
At the preliminary hearing Ms. Kyarsgaard identified
the Appellant as the man she observed in front of the store.
In fact, the preliminary hearing transcript indicates the
witness left the stand and physically touched the Appellant.
(Addendum C at 143).
Yet at trial, Ms. Kyarsgaard identified codefendant
Allen David Johnson as the man she encountered in the store.
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the court the clothing he was wearing.

All of this was done

without reservation, and in spite of the fact that Mr. Johnson
looks nothing like the Appellant who was in the courtroom at
the time (R. 1181).

Indeed, it was not until after the court

recessed for a period and Ms. Kyarsgaard had retaken the stand
that she was able to identify the Appellant Branch (R.
1227-28).
The fourth factor to consider under Biggers is the
level of certainty claimed by the eyewitness in making the
identification.
at

best.

Here again, the identification is questionable

While Ms. Kyarsgaard, after recanting her

identification of Allen Johnson, claims she is sure the suspect
was Mr. Branch, several factors question such a claim.
At the preliminary hearing Ms. Kyarsgaard stated the
following:
Q. (by the State) Will you give us a
description?
A. I can only give you a slight one of
the one that was in the bathroom because
I didn't see his face, but the one in the
showcase...
Q. Did you see the face of the one in the
showcase?
A. Well, he had glasses on so it is a
little difficult. (Emphasis added.)
(Addendum C at 142).
In addition, testimony reveals that at trial the witness was
also mistaken as to the height of the suspect (R. 1233-1234),
who kept his head down as the witness entered the jewelry store
(Addendum C at 146). She was adamant that this man was her
height, yet, she was forced to acknowledge both at the
preliminary hearing
trial
that
the
who stood
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next to her, was substantially shorter than she (R.
1223-1237).

Ms. Kyarsgaard also testified that she had never

seen the suspect before the robbery, further reducing her
familiarity with the man.
Finally, the time period between the criminal
encounter and the identification requires scrutiny.

In this

case the Appellant does not now question the selection of Mr.
Branch from a photo array a few weeks after the crime.
However, it is important to note that Mr. Branch was only one
of two selections made by Ms. Kyarsgaard as possibly being the
suspect (R. 1237-1238).

The other selection was never charged

(R. 1238).
The identification made in court, however, was done
over six months after the encounter.

This is nearly as long as

that in Biggers, which was disturbing to the Court. Here,
given the limited view the eyewitness had of the burglar, who
was wearing a hat and dark glasses, her testimony should have
been excluded.

This is especially true given her initial

identification of Alan David Johnson, who looks nothing like
the Appellant Branch.

(R. 1233-37)
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANTfS
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION CONCERNING
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY.
At the close of the defense, the defense submitted a
requested jury instruction on the reliability of eyewitness
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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101-102).

The instruction was justified because discrepancies

in claims made by state eyewitnesses rendered their testimony
questionable.

Since the eyewitness identifications comprised

most of the proof given by the State against the Appellant, the
defense argued the instruction was crucial (R, 1619-1620).

The

trial court denied the instruction (R. 101-102) and counsel for
Appellant excepted (R. 1619-20).

4

This Court in State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah
1980); and in State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618 (Utah 1969); held
that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the
jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any
basis in the evidence to support that theory.

As noted in

State v.Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980), the defendants
entitlement to a particular jury instruction is not absolute.
Rather, it is conditioned upon the existence of evidence
supporting a theory before the instruction is warranted.

Where

a defendant has asserted a defense to justify or excuse a
criminal charge and where there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence to support it, viability of the defense then becomes a
question of fact and the jury should be charged regarding it.
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981).

In instances where

the refusal of a requested instruction results in a compromise
of the defendant's presumption of innocence, the refusal is
considered prejudicial.

United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471

(8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
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Initially, the Appellant concedes that there is no
constitutional right or other requirement that presently exists
which mandates that a trial court specifically instruct juries
on the inherent fallibility of eyewitness identification.

In

fact, this Court in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982),
left the decision of whether or not to read the Telfaire-type
instruction to the jury in the discretion of the trial court.
See also:

State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); State v.

Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251
(Utah 1984).
Where the eyewitness identification is the sole basis
for a conviction and a possibility exists for
misidentification, trial courts should give a special
eyewitness instruction to the jury.

As the court noted in

United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 552.
The presumption of innocence that safeguards
the common law system must be a premise that
is realized in instruction and not merely a
promise. In pursuance of that objective, we
have pointed out the importance of and need
for special instruction on the key issue of
identification, which emphasized to the jury
the need for finding that the circumstances of
the identification are convincing beyond a
reasonable doubt.
While courts across the country are divided as to
whether to require the Telfaire-type instruction, movement
clearly seems to be toward the giving of the instruction.

Both

the Seventh and Fourth Circuits have strongly recommended the
use of Telfaire instructions in cases where identification is a
key issue.

See United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1975); United States v.
Holley,
F.2d

Approval of the instruction has been made in numerous states,
including Utah, under certain conditions.

See State v.

Malmrose, supra; State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236 (Kansas 1981);
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889 (Mass. 1979); State
v. Benjamin, 363 A.2d 726 (Conn. Supp. 1976); State v. Calica,
514 P.2d 1354 (Or. App. 1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 917 >
(1974).
In Utah, support for giving a Telfaire instruction has
even been advanced by the State in oral arguments before this
Court in State v. Quevedo, Utah Supreme Court No. 19049 (argued
November 14, 1985), and in State v. Jonas, Utah Supreme Court
No. 20184 (argued November 15, 1985).

As the State noted in

Quevedo:
"If the State's case is based primarily on
eyewitness identification testimony, then
in most cases a Telfaire-type instruction
should be given." Quevedo, Oral Argument
(11/14/86).
In fact, the State in Jonas actually encouraged this Court to
adopt a standard mandating the instruction be given in
appropriate cases, noting:
"A standard which would require the
giving of a Telfaire-type of instruction
in cases which are primarily based upon
eyewitness identification would be a
clear guide to the trial court and a
clear guide to the State and to defense
counsel as to when these types of
instructions were appropriate."
Jones, Oral Argument (11/15/86).
The State indicated in Jonas that its position was changed
because of the number of appeals generated by this Court's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OCR, may contain errors.
current discretionary Machine-generated
review standards
and because "[T]he

literature on this subject weighs in favor of this type of
instruction and can really only help the truth finding process
in a criminal case."

Id.

This Court, in spite of the current confusion over
when to give the Telfaire instruction, has on numerous
occasions found error in a trial court's refusal to give the
instruction but upheld convictions on other grounds.

See State

v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984) (No error when witness had
ample time to view suspect under ideal conditions);); State v.
Watson, supra (No error when instruction particularly addressed
weaknesses which defendant raised in trial);

State v. Bingham,

684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984) (No error since requested instruction
adequately covered in other instructions); State v. Malmrose,
supra.

(No error where defense counsel failed to take

exception to the trial court's refusal to give the
instruction).

Under the facts of this case, however, the Court

is presented with an ideal opportunity to clarify when a
Telfaire-type instruction is warranted in a criminal case and
to enhance the ultimate search for truth.
The Appellant has already documented the various
pitfalls which are associated with eyewitness identification,
(this brief at Point I). In addition, unlike the situation in
Malmrose, the trial court here was notified by pre-trial motion
of the discrepancies in testimony of all witnesses for the
State (R. 472-538).

The trial court was provided full copies

of preliminary hearing transcripts, police reports, and table
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
summaries of Digitized
conflicts
in identifications (R. 476-477).
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A

motion was made and argued that these unreliable
identifications be excluded and was subsequently denied (R.
442,557-558).
During trial, defense counsel continued to object to
consideration of eyewitness testimony and the trial court's
attention was directed toward numerous misidentifications by
police officers and toward limitations in circumstances
surrounding the viewing.

The specific pitfalls in the

testimony of two eyewitnesses are set forth in this brief in
Point I.

These weaknesses in identifications were made

glaringly obvious during the trial when one eyewitness
misidentified one codefendant as the robber and then returned
to the stand after a recess and recanted her testimony (R.
1226-1228).
At the close of the case, there was no evidence
presented by the state other than eyewitness identifications of
the Appellant which linked him to the crime.

There were no

photographs of the robbery, no fingerprints, and no distinctive
elements relating the Appellant to the crime.

The Appellant,

when arrested, had no jewelry, no drivers license and no
money.

A search of his automobile also revealed no

incriminating evidence (R. 1397-1398).
The credibility and reliability of the eyewitness
identification was further illustrated by testimony that the
suspect was wearing a baseball cap, dark sunglasses and blue
overalls which concealed his true identity.

Unlike the

situation in Digitized
Newton,
here
no Law
witness
wasClarkafforded
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Library, J. Reuben
Law School, BYU.a clear view
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the perpetrators.

This is especially apparent given that

fully three witnesses misidentified the appellant, who
established an alibi defense (R. 1370-1393).
At the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel again
requested eyewitness testimony be excluded as being unreliable
(R. 540-41) and the motion was again denied (R. 442,557-558).
Subsequently, defense counsel submitted a Telfaire type
instruction, which was also denied (R. 101-102).

Defense

counsel took exception to the ruling (R. 1619-1620).
Clearly, here this Court is confronted with a
situation where a Telfaire type instruction was not only
warranted, but quite possibly crucial in determining the
ultimate outcome of the trial.

As noted by the State in Jonas,

the instruction, if given, would have stated "what the jurors
ought to look for in a given case to determine whether or not
the identification is or is not reliable."

Without the

instruction there is a clear possibility that the Appellant was
denied his presumption of innocence by assigning undue weight
to the eyewitness testimonies.
This Court should be especially sensitive to the
situation given the State's position in Quevedo that "the State
cannot really come up with a compelling answer why Telfaire
ought not be given rather routinely in cases that depend to a
large extent on eyewitness identification."

In this case the

failure of the trial court was particularly prejudicial and
warrants reversal.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY WITH REGARD TO INFERENCES WHICH MIGHT
BE DRAWN FROM UNEXPLAINED POSSESSION OF
RECENTLY STOLEN PROPERTY,
The Appellant, as noted in the Information (R. 23-25),
was charged with one count of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of
the first degree.

In conjunction with that charge, the trial

court instructed the jury that possession of recently stolen
property, when unexplained, created an inference that the
person holding such property stole it.

Instruction 19 read as

follows:
Under the law of the State of Utah,
possession of property recently stolen,
when a person in possession fails to
make a satisfactory explanation of such
possession, is a fact from which you may
infer that the person in possession stole
such property (R. 188).
At the time when Instruction 19 was presented to the
jury for consideration in reaching a verdict, defense counsel
strenuously objected (R. 1619-1620).

On appeal the Appellant

notes that the instruction prejudiced his right to a fair trial
for three reasons.
Initially, Mr. Branch notes that at no time was he
ever found to have been in possession of stolen property.
Officers Penrod and Figueroa of the Los Angeles Police
Department identified Mr. Branch under questionable
circumstances (this brief at Point I) as walking near the front
office of the Pink Motel but never placed the Appellant or
items of his Digitized
personal
possession
inJ. Reuben
the Clark
room
where
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
Law School,
BYU. the stolen
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the jury applied the inference to the Appellant warrants
reversal.
Assuming that the jury believed Penrod and found Mr.
Branch to be at the Pink Motel and thus by inference in
possession of stolen property, the Appellant notes that the
jury instruction deprived him of his right to remain silent by
requiring the "person in possession" to explain how he obtained
the stolen property.

Without such an explanation by the

Appellant, the instruction allowed the jury to infer the
jewelry was stolen by him.

Such a situation clearly violates

Mr. Branch's right to remain silent.
Instruction 19 is in part based on Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-402(1)(1953) which states that:
"Possession of property recently stolen,
when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facia evidence that the person in possession
stole the property."
While the Appellant concedes the constitutionality of the
statute, he does challenge the instruction as read to the
jury.

See State v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861, 868 (Utah 1981).
Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution a defendant in a criminal trial may not be
compelled to testify on his own behalf.

To require a defendant

to testify on his own behalf is a form of self incrimination
which is clearly prohibited.
Here, the instruction as read to the jury required
testimony from the Appellant since it stated that an inference
that the defendant stole property in his possession may be
drawn when "ja person in possession fails to make a satisfactory
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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While the Chambers instruction does not specify who must
explain possession of stolen property, Instruction 19 in this
case allows the jury to draw an inference when "_a person in
possession fails

to make £ satisfactory explanation

possession. (Emphasis added.)"

of such

In clear and plain terms, this

instruction called upon Mr. Branch to explain possession of the
stolen property or allow the jury to infer it was stolen by his
silence.
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
a jury instruction which stated that "The law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts."

^d. at 415.

As a threshold inquiry the Court noted

that the ascertainment the constitutionality of such a jury
instruction "requires careful attention to the words actually
spoken to the jury, for whether a defendant has been accorded
his constitutional rights depends upon the way which a
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction."

J^d.

at 514.
In reversing Sandstrom1s conviction, the Court noted
that since there was a reasonable possibility the jury might
misinterpret the jury instruction the instruction was
unconstitutional.

I^d. at 526.

Here in plain terms the jury

instruction requires "a person in possession" to explain how he
came into possession of stolen goods.

As such the jury could

clearly have assumed Mr. Branch's failure to testify created,
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
Clark Law in
School,
BYU.
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3 4 3 U . S . i{J0,

802 (1952), "This notion basic in our law and rightly one of
the boasts of a free society is a requirement and a safeguard
of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of
due process."
Consequently, in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, the
Court determined that the government's burden applied to
proving each and every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt and any jury instruction which shifted that
burden violated Due Process of law.

Such a shift existed with

regard to Instruction 19 in this case.
As earlier noted, Instruction 19 indicated the jurors
"may infer" stolen property in possession of the Appellant was
stolen by him unless he explained differently.

Although the

instruction did not use the word "presumption," rather choosing
"may infer," it still does not place the burden of proof with
the State.
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., defines "inference"
as "a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition
sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence
from other facts, already proved or admitted."

As such, the

instruction told the jurors that once Mr. Branch was proven to
have been in possession of the stolen jewelry they could infer
he robbed the jewelry store without any further proof.

Such an

instruction clearly forced the Appellant to rebut the inference
when he has no burden to produce any evidence.
In the recent case of Francis v. Franklin,
U.S.

, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985) the Supreme Court considered a
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POINT IV
THE APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED
OF BOTH THE OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
AND THE INCLUDED OFFENSES OF AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT AND THEFT,
Before trial, Mr. Branch's attorney filed a "Motion to
Dismiss Counts II and III of Amended Information."
45-46)(Addendum E).

(R.

The motion alleged that Count II,

Aggravated Assault, and Count III, Theft, were actually lesser
included offenses of Count I, Aggravated Robbery.

The motion

was heard by the trial court and denied (R.
77,95-96,558-572,583).

However, the trial judge expressed

reservations concerning the theft charge (R. 583). After
trial, the issue was again raised as part of the defendant's
"Motion for Arrest of Judgment." (R.260-262,1705-1734). Again,
the motion was denied (R. 263,1735).
According to Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)(1953 as
amended) a defendant in a criminal case "may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but may not be
convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense."

In other words, a defendant may be convicted of a

lesser included offense as an alternative to conviction of the
greater offense, but he may not be convicted of both the lesser
and greater offenses.
State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) is a case
nearly identical to the present case.

In Hill, the defendant

robbed a hotel manager and guest at gunpoint.

After the two

victims were bound and gagged, the defendant took several items
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of property and some c a s h .

The defendant was subsequently

c 1: i a r g e d w i t h a i i d c o i: i i : t e d :»f f c \ i r ::: r i n i < = s i i it ::: 1 \ i d i r I g a g :j r a v a t e d :'
robbery and t h e f t .

Ij3. at 9 7 . On a p p e a l , the defendant

c o i 11 ended t h a t t he c on 1 ? i c t i o n f or t heft w a s i mpr o pe r s i i I c e the'
theft w a s a lesser included o f f e n s e of a g g r a v a t e d robbe l y .
In Hill f this Court cone] tided t .1 lat, i i l order t :o
" • :;

d e t e r m i n e i f a g r e a t E; I: ] e s s e r r e ] a t :i o n s 1 I :i j: • < * x i s t s , a '

t h e o r e t i c a 1 c omp a r iso n of t he statu t o r y e1e me n t s of t he c r i mes
j n questioi i is i n s u f f i c i e n t .

XcL at 9 7 . T h e cot irt must also

coi Isider the e v i d e n c e to d e t e r m i n e whether a g r e a t e r - 1 e s s e r
relationship exists,

The Court then made such an examination

• : • f the fact, E; ii i :t H x l ] ai I• :I 1: Ie] ::1 t1 iat :i i: i 1:1 i.a t ii nstai ice 11: Ieft w a s -.•
indeed a lesser, i n c 1 u ded o f f ens e o f a gg r a v a t ed robber y

ThiIs ,

§76 -1-402{3) clearly barred convi cti on and p u n i s h m e n t for bo11 i
theft and aggravated r o b b e r y ,

1^3. at: 9 8 .

•''.-.•'

/, T H E A P P E L L A N T W A S IMPROPERLY C O N V I C T E D
OF T H E F T . .
, .. ..
.
D i s t i n g u : -»
respect

' <» '

c a s e , .:.-•

l|i|i|

f" a 1
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\\
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* • s

.

H i l l f t; *

.
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"

. .possible with
fies

I nit \\ \\ i .i;.

'-;.-< s*t net >re the *.ry showed a

c o m p l e t e d r o b b e r y w i t h the s t o r e f s p r o p e r t y taken f r o m i. ii e
p e r s o n of t .he e m p l o y e e , J o a n n e K n a p h u s , by the i lse oil: i
firearm.

T h e crime of tl left w a s part of that same c r i m i n a l \. ;-

e p i sode

U i i •• :i = • r i d e n t i c a J c i r c urn s t a i I c e s

t 1: I e Hi 1,,] C o l 11: I

concluded, "As to thi s variatior l of aggravated robbery, the •
crime of theft i_s a ] esser ineluded offense.™

jrd. at

(emphasis that :»f ori gina] )
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The only distinction between this case and Hill is
that in Hill both crimes were alleged to have involved one
victim.

Here, the prosecutor (who was the same prosecutor as

in Hill (R. 560)) charged the victim of the robbery was the
employee, Joanne Knaphus, while the victim of the theft was
alleged to be the store, Oakwood Jewelry (R.23-25).

In fact,

this difference in victims was merely a subterfuge on the part
of the prosecution in an attempt to subvert Hill.

Indeed, the

perpetrators did not intend to rob Joanne Knaphus; they
intended to rob the Oakwood Jewelry Store.

Despite what the

charging document alleges, the actual, intended victim of both
the robbery and the theft was one and the same.

Any other

conclusion amounts to sheer fantasy.
Hill is dispositive of this case and therefore, Mr.
Branch's conviction of theft should be reversed and the
sentence vacated.
B. THE APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED
OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
Mr. Branch was also convicted of aggravated assault
which purportedly occurred against the person of a customer,
Stella Kyarsgaard, who entered the store during the course of
the robbery (R. 23-25,1210).

At first appearance, this

distinction would seem to remove the assault charge from the
ambit of Hill.

A closer inspection, however, reveals that Hill

is still applicable.
The two men who entered the store did so with the sole
intention of robbing the store.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1953

as amended) requires
that
oneLawwho
anSchool,
offense
act with
Digitized by the Howard
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Library,commits
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BYU.
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the r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e ,

~ t h i ^ r s < - ^ , *-v»* c o m m i s s i o n of an

ag :jravated assault required the act ••

i

;

' ^ ' - n another , wi I :h

the threat accompanied b y a show of i i ni i: i« = •< ::iiiate foi : : e : • :n :
a c c o m p l i s h e d b y the use of a deadly weapon,,

i :>] < 2 <: e

Ui: .ah Code Ai in. •-,•.

I l a g g r a i r „ a, i „ e d a s s a i i ] t , t h e i n t e i 11

§ 7 6 5 ] 0 3 (] 9 5 3 a s a m € • i i d e d )

i s t o do s e r i o u s b od :i 1 y i n j u r y o r t o 11 I r ea t e n su ch i n j u r y b y
the u s e of a deadly w e a p o n ,

T h e :i ntent

:i n an a g g r a v a t e d

•-• :

robbery is to take the proper ty ::i i i J: ossess::i oi l • ::»f ai Io11: i E;I: b;y I :::I: :te
IPe:ins o f f o r c e < :)r fea:i: w::i 11 I t :. 1 Ie u s e o f a d e a d l y w e a p o n .

Every

a • i:. i • •' =! d i: o b b e r y i I e c e s s a r i Il ] • i i l • ::i Jl i i d e s a n a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t .
In ti lis c a s e , M s . K y a r s g a a r d t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e ' •:• :••.:•• ;^.-.v o i u n t a r i l y we n t t o t h e r e a i: o f t h e s t o r e ( R, 1 2.1 3 - 1 2 1 4 ) .

As

she began to enter 11 I e r e a i : ai:ea ::> I: 11: i€ • s 1 oi:e i( ::> 1 ie testi fied
that s h e w a s pushed from behi nd by an \ inarmed m a n whom s h e
:ei Iu• :>i i :::>] ] ' :i deit 11 ii f::i e d a, 3 Ml:i: B r a n c I i ( R . •.••<.-'• '-• '
1215-4.217/3 22:6-] 228)

• •

In tl le real : < :»f the store, M s . Kyarsgaard

was escorted to a bathroom by a second man armed witi I a gun (R,
1 2 ]
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POINT V
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT.
,

1

..••.'.

.

.

The Appellant was found guilty at trial of Aggravated
Robbery, a felony of the first degree, with a firearm
enchancement under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended)
and Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as amended); Aggravated
Assault, a felony of the third degree under Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-103 (1953 as amended); and of theft, a felony of the
second degree under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (1953 as amended)
(R. 23-25).

He now argues that the prosecution produced

insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions and therefore
requests a reversal of those convictions.
To convict Mr. Branch of the crimes charged above, the
prosecution must have introduced evidence sufficient to
eliminate all reasonable doubts as to his innocence from the
minds of the jurors.

This basic standard is codified in Utah

Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1953 as amended), which states:
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element
of the offense charged against him is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of
such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980), Justice
Maughan, dissenting, addressed this undisputed standard with
regard to sufficiency arguments, concluding
This standard provides the basis for
appellate review of a jury's verdict.
While it is the sole province of the
jury to assess the credibility of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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:.r=e var. • O U J .* ^ •• - ^Soes .v.-•] letarmi .:e
the weight of t h e e v i d e n c e , this
Court must review t h e s u f f i c i e n c y
of t h e evidence upon which t h e jury
bases its final d e t e r m i n a t i o n . If
the e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d is so lacking
that no reasonable p e r s o n could conclude
I* eliminates -i": 1 r e a s o n a b l e doubt of
the d e f e n d a n t ' s guilt then w e must
aside t h e jury v e r d i c t .
I_d

at 2 3 2 .
Consequent!;-,
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1 1 I this c a s e , since a 11 charges stem

from a sing 1 e crimina1 e p i s o d e , the p r o s e c u t i o n must have
proven that o n or a be i it August 18 , 19 8 4 ,, Mr

Branch either

attempted t .c ::ort ti i: ii 1 : ! : r :> :>i in i t:i \ :ted t J: le :n : bber^ of Oakwoo* 3 J ewe] ry
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sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Kerekes, Utah
662 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980);
State v. Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d
761, 762 (1979); State v. Daniels,
Utah, 584 P.2d 880, 882-83 (1978);
State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216,
219 (1976).
Id. at 444.
(1985).

See Also:

State v. Williams, 24 Utah Adv. Rep. 3

While recognizing that certain deference be granted to
the jury verdict, the Court nevertheless cautioned that,
In fulfillment of its duty to review
the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the
verdict, the reviewing court will
stretch the evidentiary fabric as
far as it will go. But this does
not mean that the court can take a
speculative leap across a remaining
gap in order to sustain a verdict.
The evidence, stretched to its utmost
limits, must be sufficient to prove
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, State in re J.S.H., Utah, 642 P.2d
386 (1982); State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 621
P.2d 1238, 1240 (1980).
Id. at 445.

In the present case, the failure of the State to

prove any essential element beyond a reasonable doubt means
this Court must reverse.

State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48,51

(Utah 1983).
Here the fabric woven by the prosecutor was
insufficient to sustain a conviction of Mr. Branch.

There was

no real evidence linking the Appellant to the scene of the
crime.

No fingerprints or pictures were presented.
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In fact,

the robbers left the jewelry store with no clues a s to their
• • v-: .•'''•' '.'

- ' - .-..'- • ' .•' /'. . •['

i • zlentiti e s

.' : Y'.

;

• •. "'"' : ' .

The Oakwood e m p l o y e e w h o w a s robbed could n o t identi fy
Mr

Branch (R. 6 2 1 / 6 5 4 , 6 5 8 ) , a n d t h e onJ ;; r customer ii i t h e store

I i 11 t i a 1 1 i :i d e i 11 i f :i e < :i A 3 1 e i i I) a v i • :i ] o 1 11 I s o i i a s t h e r :»b b e r a t t r i a ]
(R. 1212 ) ,

Whi1e t h e c us t omer i dent i fi e d Pa u1 Br a nc h 1 a t e r in

t h € 1 r :i a ] , r € : a i I t i i I g 1 I e r e a r J i e i: i d e i 11 i f i c a t i o r i

(R

120 7 4J ) ,

her t e s t i m o n y w a s s h o w n to b e i n c o n s i s t e n t a n d u n r e 1 i a b 1 e (See ;
' ':'::' '

this brief at Point I B ) .

A ] ] o t I: i« 2 r t e s 1 : :i n to i i,} f r • : n: i < * y e w i 1 i i e s s e s • //1: i o i d e i I t i f i e d
Mr. B r a n c h a t t r i a l c o u l d o n l y i d e n t i f y I liin, o u t s i d e t h e s t o r e
I i o .1 d i i i g a g a r b a g e b a g

N c i I < 2 • :> f 11 i e s e e ] • e w i t n e s s e s c o \ 11 :I s t a t e .

wh a t t he mai I c 1 a imed f: o b e Br a n c h w a s ca r r y i ng

(See t e s t imo ny

of Marsha Wri g h t , R, 1 077 -J ] 2:5 ; .Misty Wr I g h t , R. ] 1 2 6 - ] 1 19 ;
L e s 1 i e Bi 11 ] < > i •,

R

Daniel W i l l i a m s , R

J ] 5 0 - 1 16 5 , Me J ai: I I c • Mei e r s i,

] ] 81-1206).

R

; •-•

1 II 6 5 J ] 7 3 ;

in a d d i t i o n , t h e

' -• '

• • '•'

i d e n t i f I, c a t i o i I s a n • :I ::i i s c r e p a n c :i e s o f e a c 1 I e y e w :i t n e s s w a s i i o t
o n 1 y i n t er na 1 1 y in c o n s i s t e i I t, b u t a 1 s o inc o n s i s t e nt w i t h th e
d e s c r i p t i o n s a n d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of t h e other e y e w i t n e s s e s (R.
4 73 •5 .

" '.'.

•'" '
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' :"• '
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"

•'
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'
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Mr. Branch w a s also never provei I to b e i n p o s s e s s i o n
of the stolen jewelry

(See this o r ^ t

au ^ U I I I L I I I / .

f a c t, • a t t r i a II t h e r e \ fa s f a r m o ' ° p v i d e n c p i- h a i- i m n 1 i o a +
Appellant's h a 1 f-b r o th e r , J oey
B r a n c!: 1

v

.•

-. * r

C o • 3 e f e n d a n t P. ] ] e n J o h n

Mi era w a s i n Ca lifornia pawni ng
and not paul

\

- v H <; - t

-*
•

-w * . *-

Branch (R. 1469,14b*,,-L4>a., .
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*hile personal
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property belonging to Mr. Miera was found in the Pink Motel
room ten with the stolen jewelry, no property belonging to Mr.
Branch was discovered (See this brief at Point III). The room
was not registered in Mr. Branch's name (R. 954-957), nor was
there any property owned by him found in Raymond Johnson's car
(R. 957).
The arresting officers initially identified Mr. Miera
as the man near the Pink Motel office, and Mr. Miera's picture
was picked by the owner of the Valley Gold and Silver Exchange
as possibly being the man who traded the stolen jewelry.

The

owner could not subsequently identify Mr. Branch during the
trial (See this brief at Point III).
When all this evidence is considered there is a
considerable doubt that the Appellant committed the crime
charged.

This is especially true given that when Mr. Branch

was arrested in Salt Lake City he was holding no jewelry or
money, nor was any found in his automobile (R. 1397).

Mr.

Branch also presented the jury with evidence of an alibi (R.
56).

The Appellant's Aunt, Ms. Ruby Archuletta, testified

under oath that Paul Branch was with her on the day of the
Oakwood Jewelry Store robbery, helping move furniture (R.
1371-1372).

Ms. Archuletta testified she was sure of the date

in question because it is the birthday of the Appellant's
daughter, Tiffany (R. 1373,1376).
Thus, for this Court to sustain the Appellant's
conviction it must find the circumstantial evidence sufficient
to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without taking a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"speculative ] eap" over gaps I n t h e evi d e n t i a r y fabric State v .
P e t r e e , 659 P 2d at 444 „

G:i ^ ) ei i that there w a s no real e v i d e n c e

p r o v i n g t h e i 3 e n t i t y o f t h e i: o b b e r s , t h i s C o u r t w :i ] ] b e h a r d
p r e s s e d t o up h o 1 d t h e co n v i c t i o n.

M r , B r a n c h w a s n e v e i: f o u n d

:i i I ]:: • o s s e s s :i :> i I c • f !: II: I = • j € • , «e • ] r i a i l :i II: < = • p i: e s « ::; n t e d t: 1 I e j i i :i : ]
f u l 1 accoui it of h i s a c t i o n s oi i the d a y of the c r i m e . ••.•..•..• •..:••
F u r t h e r m o r e , vast amounts of ev idence tended to show ti le robber
m i g h t h a v e b e e n J o e y M i e r a , h a 1 f - b r o t h e i: o f 11 I - : » A p p e J 1 a n t .
Since there- . .* ^jie
Mr

Br an<

than reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
;

er di :::t s 1 ic: i i] ::i b e i:e1 rer sed." ' ' "•. ';
• •
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Any p e r s o n w h o h a s been twice convicted,
s e n t e n c e d , a n d committed for felony o f f e n s e s
at least o n e of which o f f e n s e s having been at
least a felony of the second degree or a crime
w h i c h , if committed w i t h i n this state would
have been a capital felony, felony of the
first degree or felony of second d e g r e e , and
was committed to a n y p r i s o n , may, upon c o n v i c t i o n
of at least a felony murder in t h e first or
second d e g r e e , be d e t e r m i n e d as a habitual
criminal a n d be imprisoned in t h e state prison
for from five y e a r s to 1 i fe,
s il: • :::) i: I : t II: :i e s t a t I i t e i: e < j i i :i r e s t h e s t a t e •, i i p o n
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present evidence of two other felony convictions which resulted
in sentencing and commitment.

In the case at bar, the

prosecution actually presented evidence of three past
convictions, each of which apparently resulted in commitment.
The convictions were for Unlawful Distribution for Value of a
Controlled Substance in 1973; for Aggravated Robbery, a first
degree felony, in 1975; and for Attempted Escape, a third
degree felony in 1983.

The evidence of the Attempted Escape

conviction, sentencing, and commitment in January 1983
consisted of Appellant's signed affidavit proving that he
entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and
indicating that he was committed to Utah State Prison.

(R.

1740, exhibit 3-S) . The evidence of the Unlawful Distribution
for Value of a Controlled Substance conviction, sentencing, and
commitment in October, 1973 consisted of judicially-issued
commitment orders and a court record of Appellant's entry of a
guilty plea (not an affidavit signed by Appellant) (R. 1736,
exhibit 4-S). The 1975 Aggravated Robbery conviction,
sentencing and commitment were proved with a certified copy of
Mr. Branch's file indicating the date of his commitment and
containing receipts from the sheriff and prison officer showing
that Mr. Branch was delivered and received at the prison (R.
1736, Exhibit 2-S).
In summary, only one of the three prior convictions
was substantiated with a signed affidavit tending to prove that
Mr. Branch entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.
Appellant brought a motion to dismiss the habitual criminal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Determining Whether the Plea is Voluntary,
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty
without first determining that the plea
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the result of a plea agreement, the
agreement shall be stated and confirmed
in open court. The court shall determine
whether any force of threats or any
promises, apart from a plea agreement,
were used to obtain the plea.
c.

Determining Factual Basis for Plea.
The court shall not enter final judgment
on a plea of guilty without first determining that there is a factual basis for
the plea, and that all requirements of
law for acceptance of guilty plea have
been met.

d.

Use of Affidavit of Defendant.
The Court may establish the foregoing
requirements in the record by use of
a written affidavit executed by the
defendant before the court, the substance
of which shall be substantially the
form as contained in the "Affidavit of
Defendant" form.

The use of an affidavit of the defendant is
discretionary

with the trial court under subsection (d) of

this statute.

Appellant argues that the execution of the

affidavit should be mandatory; in any event, he argues that
equivalent means were not resorted to prove that his guilty
pleas were knowing and voluntary in the 1973 and 1975
convictions. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the
United States Supreme Court held that a guilty plea, in order
to be valid, must be accompanied by an affirmative showing that
it was intelligently and voluntarily entered.

The Court

required specifically that the trial court accept guilty pleas
only after determining that the accused is voluntarily,
knowingly waiving his rights to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination, to demand a trial by jury, and to confront
his accusers.

Appellant in the case at bar argues that Utah
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new conviction was based, failed to show that the defendant was
represented by counsel or had knowingly and intelligently
waived the right to counsel.
The Washington Court of Appeals held in a 1981 case
that when using a prior conviction to prove an accused's
habitual criminal status, the state has the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that he understood the nature of the
offense and the consequences of pleading guilty.
Chervenell, 626 p.2D 530 (Ct. App. Wash. 1981).

State v.
In Chervenell,

the state introduced a "Statement of Defendant on Plea of
Guilty" form to prove defendant entered his plea voluntarily.
However, the court was not prepared to assume without further
evidence that the signature had been affixed in full
understanding of the contents of the form.

I_d. at 532.

These cases show that the state must not only
demonstrate the existence of prior convictions but must also
show the validity of those convictions.

Mr. Branch is asking

this Court to reverse his conviction on Count IV of the
Information against him because the state did not meet its
burden of providing an adequate basis for the trial court to
find that Appellant's guilty pleas in two of three prior felony
convictions were knowingly and voluntarily entered.

The clear

implication of Saunders, Burgett, and Chervenell is that
something in the nature of a Boykin affidavit signed by
defendant and counsel is essential to prove a knowing and
voluntary guilty plea.

Such an affidavit was introduced as

evidence of only one of the three prior felony convictions;
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consequently, Appellant asks the Court to reverse his
conviction under Utah Code Ann, §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended),
POINT VII
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS WARRANTS
REVERSAL OF MR, BRANCH'S CONVICTION,
In his final point, Mr. Branch argues his conviction
should be reversed because the cumulative effect of errors in
the trial below deprived him of his right to a fair trial
before an impartial jury.

The doctrine of "cumulative error"

refers to a number of errors which prejudice a defendant's
right to be tried in a fair manner.

State v. Close/ 623 P.2d

940, 948 (Mont. 1981).
The Appellant concedes that in the absence of
prejudice there is no reversible error.

State v. Phelps, 696

P.2d 447, 454 (Mont. 1985); State v. Hoxsie, 677 P.2d 620,623
(N.M. 1984); State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333,336 (Utah 1980).
However courts have the responsibility to ensure that a
defendant receives a just trial and any conviction obtained in
a proceeding in which the cumulative impact of irregularities
is so prejudicial to a defendant that he is deprived of that
right must be reversed.
(N.M. 1984).

State v. Martin, 686 P.2d 937,943

Reversal is required even though no one of the

errors standing alone warrants a reversal,
636 P.2d 807,814 (Kan. C. of A. 1981).
the errors are procedural in nature.

state v. Thomas,

This is true even if
People v. Hemrick, 624

P.2d 1333, 1338
(Colo. C. of A. 1979).
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While there is no established test to determine when
errors in a trial warrant a reversal, courts generally view the
circumstances of the entire trial.
660, 669 (Kan. 1984).

State v. Williams, 682 P.2d

Factors which are generally weighed are

the closeness of guilt or innocence, the quantity and character
of the errors, and the gravity of the crime charged.
v. State, 692 P.2d 1288 (Nev. 1985).

Big Pond

Underlying each of these

factors is the "supervisory function of the appellate court in
maintaining the standards of the trial bench and bar, to the
end that all defendants will be accorded a fair trial."
Weakland v. State, 615 P.2d 252,254 (Nev. 1980).
A review of the record in this case reveals that the
evidence was not overwhelming.

In fact, by the end of the

trial, there was considerable doubt as to the whether or not
the robber was Appellant's half-brother, Joey Miera, a man who
closely resembles the Appellant (See Addendum B). There was
actually more evidence implicating Mr. Miera than there was
implicating the Appellant.
The record reveals that there was no direct evidence
introduced against the Appellant such as fingerprints and no
photographs.

When the Appellant was arrested, he had no

jewelry on his person or in his car (R. 1397).

Rather than

having a large amount of money in his possession, Mr. Branch
was carrying only small change (R. 1397).

In addition, Mr.

Branch, in his defense, was able to account for all of his
actions on the day of the crime through an alibi (R. 1370).
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While there were witnesses who identified Mr. Branch
as being at the crime scene, the circumstances of their viewing
were such that their reliability is questionable.

The only

witness to view the suspect in the jewelry store actually
mis-identified the codefendant, David Allen Johnson as the
robber at trial, later recanting her identification (R.
1212-1228).

Given that the two men look nothing alike, one can

only doubt the reliability of the witness1 identification of
Mr. Branch.
While the record reveals that other witnesses claimed
to have viewed Mr. Branch at the Oakwood Jewelry Store, the
circumstances surrounding the incident show that the robber was
wearing dark sunglasses and a hat to conceal his identity (R.
1212-1218), with no witness getting a clear view of the
suspectfs face.

Given that the Appellant and Mr. Miera closely

resemble each other, except as to height, one can only wonder
which man was really involved in the crime.
Other testimony and evidence which was considered at
trial tended to implicate Mr. Miera rather than the Appellant.
Two Los Angeles Police Officers who identified Mr. Branch as
being in the Pink Motel parking lot on the day substantial
amounts of jewelry were recovered initially claimed it was Mr.
Miera they saw and not the Appellant (R. 1035-1037,1059-1062,
953-955).

In addition, personal items belonging to Joey Miera

were found in Room ten of the motel while nothing was found
which belonged to Mr. Branch.

Indeed, the officers conceded

that no proof existed which tied the Appellant to either the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Pink Motel or to the shop where the jewelry was pawned (R.
954-957) .
Even more revealing was the testimony by codefendant
David Alan Johnson that Mr. Branch did not accompany the group
to California (R. 1469,1482,1491).

Rather, Johnson testified

that it was Joey Miera who brought the jewelry to be pawned and
not Mr. Branch.

Indeed, the pawn broker where the jewelry was

sold was able to select a picture of Mr. Miera as possibly
being one of the men who sold the jewelry shortly after the
sale (R. 955-956).

That same broken however, could not make an

identification of Mr. Branch at trial (R. 1370).
Thus, in reviewing the closeness of guilt or innocence
one can only wonder about the reliability of the Appellantfs
conviction.

Rather than being overwhelming, the state's case

actually produced more evidence implicating Joey Miera than it
produced implicating the Appellant.
The second consideration of this court here is the
quantity and character of the errors in the trial below.

Here

again there is much to lead to the conclusion that Mr. Branch
was not given a fair trial.
Error began with the trial court refusing to sever the
cases of the three codefendants.

As a result, the Appellant

was tried with the defendants who were found in possession of
amounts of stolen jewelry, none of which could be tied to the
Appellant.

Indeed, the testimony at trial dealing with the

recovery of stolen jewelry covered hundreds of pages while only
extremely limited testimony actually involved the Appellant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Given that there was no proof that Mr. Branch was even in the
State of California, such testimony was clearly irrelevant to
his case.

The possibility that Mr. Branch was convicted by

association in trial with the Johnson brothers is a very real
prospect that cannot be ignored.

Tried separately, attention

would have been focused on the questionable testimony of the
Los Angeles Police Officers and not on the recovery of the
stolen property since Mr. Branch was never found in possession
of any jewelry.
The impact of the trial court's error is further
magnified by Instruction 19, which was given to the jury.

It

indicated that someone in possession of recently stolen
property who is unable to explain such possession may be
presumed to have stolen that property.

Such an instruction,

already discouraged by this Court, should have never been
applied to the Appellant.
The record is remarkably clear that at no point is Mr.
Branch ever found in possession of stolen jewelry.

The

officers who testified that they saw the Appellant did not see
him in room ten.

Rather, the officers testified that the man

they eventually believed to be Mr. Branch was found near the
front office (R. 695). Cross-examination by defense counsel
further revealed that the motel room where the jewelry was
found was not registered to Mr. Branch (R. 348) nor was there
any evidence indicating the Appellant had been near the
jewelry.

Given the uncontradicted testimony, how could the

trial court ever have concluded that the presumption
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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instruction could apply to the Appellant, who was never found
in possession of jewelry?
Even worse, the trial court further compromised Mr.
Branch's right to a fair trial by allowing the officers to
testify they saw Mr. Branch at the Pink Motel when the
reliability of that testimony was clearly questionable.

The

officers saw this unidentified man for only a few seconds and
under circumstances that were incriminating at best.

This

unidentified man was doing nothing illegal at the time the
officers drove past, and the officers1 attention was directed
toward ongoing illegal activity at the other end of the motel.
Any question about the reliability of the
identifications could be answered by the fact that the officers
initially identified the man in the lot as being Joey Miera.
Indeed, it wasn't until the preliminary hearing, held months
later, that the officers changed their story to identify Mr.
Branch (R. 454-455).
Under such tenuous circumstances the trial court
should have excluded the identifications as being unreliable
but did not.

The trial court might have still protected Mr.

Branch by allowing

jury instruction which explained the limits

and dangers of eyewitness identifications.

Yet, again the

trial court refused, leaving the Appellant unprotected and
vulnerable to injustice.

When viewed along with the failure to

dismiss Aggravated Assault and Theft charges as lesser included
offenses which had the effect of charge stacking and unduly
prejudicing the Appellant before the jury, the mention of drugs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and syringes and the misidentification of Mr. Branch at trial
one wonders how he could have not been convicted.

At no point

did that trial court ever act in a manner consistent with the
ideal that Mr. Branch be given a fair trial.
The final consideration is the gravity of the offense
charged.

Here again this Court will view circumstances in

favor of reversing the conviction below.

While the Appellant

was convicted of a serious crime, the record reveals he was
unarmed during the alleged robbery and that he never harmed
those in the store during the crime.

In determining the

sentence, even the trial court noted that the Appellant was an
upstanding young man with an excellent chance at rehabilitation
(R. 1781-1782).
In viewing the circumstances of Mr. Branch's trial,
one must conclude that prejudicial error was committed.

It has

always been understood that public support for a system of
justice depends not only on the capacity of that system to
render justice in fact, but also on its ability to protect the
parties in an image of fairness.

As stated by Justice Traynor

in R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error, 20, 22 (1970):
[T]he litigant has a right to objective
consideration of all proper evidence by
triers of fact without violations of any
substantial rights he may have a a litigant.
He is entitled not to a trial free of all
possible error but to a trial free of harmful
error.
. . . [W]here the error is so forceful as to
leave its mark on the judgment, the trial itself
[is] contaminated. An appellant whose right to
a fair trial in a trial court has been vitiated
should be accorded that right anew. Retrial is a
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CONCLUSION
Because the Appellant was charged with and convicted
of Aggravated Robbery as well as Theft and Aggravated Assault,
lesser, included offenses the Appellant requests that this
Court reverse his conviction and vacate the sentences for the
lesser offenses.

Because the Appellant's conviction of being a

habitual criminal was constitutionally infirm, the Appellant
requests that this Court reverse that conviction and remand for
either further proceedings or dismissal of the charge.

Because

Appellant's convictions for Aggravated Robbery, Theft, and
Aggravated Assault were tainted by numerous errors, the
Appellant requests that this Court reverse those convictions
and remand either for a new trial or dismissal of the charges.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "N / day of April, 1986.

-a^yjb /jJll^J

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellant

CfiRISTOPH/E
CHRISTOPHER KERECWAN

Attorney for Apgfellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, BROOKE C. WELLS, hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Appellant',. .^r-ipf wi 1 ] be delivered to the
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake ^

,

)4114 this

/ day of Ap):il

)86.

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellant

T*: MVERED
day of April, 1986.
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BROOKE C. WELLS (#3421)
foe 31 2S0WM
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
DEPUrTOLERK
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

£

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS IN-COURT
IDENTIFICATION

Plaintiff
-vPAUL ANTHONY BRANCH,

Case No. CR-84-1266
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant

COMES NOW the Defendant, PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH, by and
through his attorney of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, and moves the
Court for an Order suppressing any in-court identifications of
Defendant Branch by prosecution witnesses.

Defendant's trial

is scheduled to begin on January 15, 1985. This Motion is made
on the grounds that previous identifications of Defendant Branch
by prosecution witnesses have been so suggestive and unreliable
as to render future possible identifications excludable under
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, and in violation of Defendant's
constitutional rights prohibiting abuse of due process:
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jj>£) day of December, 1984.

LJd^^^

BROOKECVWELLS
Attorney for Defendant
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DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this J>/

day of December, 1984,

MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Joe Fratto, Jr. Attorney
431 South Third East, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
o i

this /*>/

day cf December, 1984.

MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Ed Brass, Attorney,
321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 3 /
December, 1984.
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PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH

a 5-3-1-n-4-i T80
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JOEY MIERA

ADDENDUM C

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

NO OBJECTION
JUDGE: You may be excused, thank you mame

(SIDE B MARK 25)
DIRECT EXAMINATION
HOUSELY: Will you state your full name please
A: Stella Kyarsgaard
Q: Will you spell your last name
A: Kyarsgaard
Q: Is it Mrs. Kyarsgaard
A: Yes
Q: Mrs. Kyarsgaard on August 18, 1984, where were you employed
A: At the chesse and wine cellar
Q: Where is that located
A: Hillside Plaza
Q: Do you know where the Oakwood Jewelry store was located at
that time
A: Yes I did
Q: Where was the place of your employment from that store
A: 50 yards maybe
Q: The same side of the street
A: No kitty corner
Q: On that day did you have occasion to go into the Oakwood Jewelry
store
A: Yes I did
Q: About what time did you go in
A: About 5:10 approximately
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0: Was that the first time you had been in there on that date
A: No I went in earlier to, to take my rings in to be cleaned
0: O.K. did you, did you know the person that was in there when
you did that
Yes
Who was it.
It was Bob, no it wasn't Bob it was Jo Anne
Jo Anne was in there
Yes
Did you leave your rings there
Yes I did
Alright, uh, when you went in about 5:10 was there anyone
in there^
Yes
How many people were in there
One that I saw
Okay what happened as you entered the store
Well I entered the store and this man was on the right hand
side of the showcase, I didn't know who he was so I just looked
over and he shouted something to somebody in the backroom, which
I thought he said Bob and I said I will carry on, I will go back
so I went back and that's when I
Q: What happened when you got to the back
A: Well I thought something wasn't quite right so I was going
to change my mind and come back out and he pushed me and then
came out of the bathroom and grabbed me
0: Okay and the person that went, there was a second person in
the back
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A: Yes. there was

0: Was that male too
A: Yes
0: And thatf s the one that you thought the other one called Bob
A: Correct
Q: Did you see whether that other person in the back had anything
in his hands
A: Yes he had a gun
Q: Did you see the gun
A: Yes I did
0: Did you see where the gun was pointed
A: It seemed like it was pointed at me
Q: Can you give me a description of that gun
A: Silver, silver looking, small, a small gun and black handle,
I can't say it was a black handle, I didn't see the handle, black
dial and a silver, like a small silver gun
Q: Do you know the difference between a hand gun and a rifle
or a shotgynn
A: Yes I do
Q: Which would you call this
A: It was a small handgun
Q: Do you know the difference between an automatic and a revolver
A: No I don't :,
Q: Did that person who was in the back say anything to you
A: Yes he said don't look at me
Q: Anyting else
A: Well I stood in the corner, they put me in the corner there
and I stood in the corner
Q: In the bathroom
A: In the bathroom yes and Jo Anne was already in the toilet
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

0: What happened thenMachine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on George, what's taking you so long
Q: By he do you mean the person that was back by the bathroom
A: The one that was in the bathroom with us
Q: He called the other on George
A: Yes
Q: Okay and then what happened
A: Well then a long time seemed to go by and I am trying to think,
oh he said I won1t hurt you
Q: He said I won't hurt you
A: Yes I won't hurt you
Q: Okay what else
A: He said stay here, we are leaving he said stay for 10 minutes
in the bathroom he said, if you move he said there is a man out
in the car that has a gun and we will use it.
Q: Okay then what happened
A: Well then he came out and then a couple of seconds later he
barged back in and said who set the alarm off
Q: Then what happened
A: Then they left
Q: Okay did Jo Anne set the alarm off
A: Yes
Q: Did the police come ultimately
A: Very quickly yes
Q: Had you ever seen either of those two persons before, the
A: No Sir
Q: Will you give us a decription
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A: I can only give you a slight one of the one that was in the
bathroom because I didn't see his face, but the one in the showcase
Q: Did you see the face of the one in the showcase
A: Well he had glasses on so it is a little difficult
Q: O.k.
A: He was mexican, dark hair, glasses on, sunglasses, moustache
Q: Can you tell me anything else about him
A: Nope
0: Did you see the man's hands that was by the showcase, down
behind the showcase
JUDGE: Will you answer yes or no please
A: Oh lam sorry, no
PROSECUTOR: Yes lam sorry you do have to
A: I am sorry
0: Articulate your answers because it is being recorded through
the microphone. Did uh, what did you see of the man that was
back by the bathroom when you got back there
A: Well he looked very tall
0: I am sorry
A: He looked tall
Q: Okay taller than you
A: Oh yes
Q: How tall are you
A: 5'2"
Q:0kay do

you recall what size shoe, whether you were wearing

high heeled shoes or flat shoes
A: I was wearing flat shoes, because I wear flat shoes for work
Q: Can you tell us approximately how tall the man in the back
was
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A: No
0: Would you be able to recognize either of those two men again
if you saw them
(Mark 30)
A: I think I would recognize the one that I saw
Q: Arid that's which one
A: The small dark one that was there when I entered the room
Q: Will you look around the room and tell me if you see either
of those men here in this room
A: That man with the
Q: Will you step down and touch the man that you are referring
to
A: Sure
0: Alright you can retake the stand
JUDGE: Let the record reflect that the witness has touched Mr.
Paul Anthony Branch
PROSECUTOR: Is that the person, which of the two

men is it that

you have just identified
A: The one that was in the showcase
Q: The one you saw at first
A: Yes
Q: How positive are you of your identification
A: May I looke at him and study
0: Sure
A: Oh I

think I am very positive

Q: Would you be able to recognize the gun again if you saw it
A: Yes
0: Let me show you what's been marked
END OF TAPE SIDE
B
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TAPE #5SL8458

PRELIMINARY HEARING:

(Continued)

STATE v. PAUL BRANCH et. al.

Q:

Case No. 84 FS 2147

I!ll show you the contents of a envelope that has been

marked Exhibit P13 and I111 ask you to look at that and tell me if
you recognize that item.
A: I thought it was a little different than that.
0: In what way?
A: Pearly, I thought this was pearly.
Q: When you said I thought this was like pearly, you were rubbing
on the frame part of the metal frame rather than the round part. Is
that right?
A: Yes
NB: Hold it up so we know what we are talking about. Thanks, would
you have her testify again as to what she was referring to.
Q: When you were describing a part of the gun that you saw that
you thought was pearly, which, would you point to the part on this gun?
The frame part of the gun.
JV: Is that the cylinder of the frame
Q:Well, let me ask

you this. If this thing that turns here, is

the cylinder and this thing that turns here is the barrel and the
frame, which part are you referring to as the part that you thought was
pearly?
A: The front part seems to be missing a piece, I donft know.
I!m sorry, but I!m not very well..
0: If it is alright, Your Honor, I will close the gun and maybe
it will make it possible to look at it a little better. Alright, does
that help?
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A: Oh yes.
JUDGE: Please don't put your finger on the trigger. It is not loaded,
but I still would appreciate it if you didn't.
A: It shows you how much I know about them. I can't really, I can't
say. It is the same size. It is a little one.
Q: Is it the same style?
A: Yes.
Q: Why did you go into the bathroom ?
A: Because I was pulled into the bathroom.
Q: Was that the only reason?
A: Yes
Q: Why did you wait in the bathroom?
A: Because he had a gun.
Q: What effect did that have on you ?
A: Well, it is rather frightening.
Q: That is all of the questions I have Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION: (N. Bergeson)
Q: I am going to call you Stella.
A:That is fine.
Q: Now, as you came into the store you didn't see JoAnn did you?
A: No.
0: The only person that you saw was an individual over by the
showcase.
A: Uh huh.
Q: I want you to turn around if you will, there is a diagram there
to the left. That proports to be a layout of the store. Do you
recognize that?
A: Uh huh.
Pk
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A: Really good.
0: Alright, would you please indicate with an "S" no just put "D"
where you saw the individual by the showcase when you first came in.
(witness is marking the diagram)
Q: Alright, that person was then behind the showcase.
A: Yes.
JUDGE: Did you put a "D" there?
E. Jones: Well, she made a mark.
A: That was supposed to be a "D".
Q: Now was that person bent over when you saw him first?
A: Yes, he was, yes.
0: Alright, and as you walked in, did that individual notice
your presence?
A: Oh yes.
0: Was it at that point that the individual turned and yelled
something toward the back of the store, right?
A: Well, I walked over there and looked and then that was when
he shouted somthing

to

Q: You think he shouted somthing like Bob?
A: I think that was what he shouted, Hey Bob, that was why I
went back there.
Q: Alright, immediately you walked to the back of the store.
Did you go through the door into the back office area?
A: No. I was pushed from about here. Pushed and he grabbed me
(inaudible) into the bathroom.
Q: Okay, as you began to walk to the back of the store, what was
the first thing that you saw?
A: As I walked to the back of the store?
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A: No, I didn!t see anybody back there.
0: So when was it then that you first saw the individual in the
back of the store.
A: When his arm came out and grabbed me and pulled me into the
0: The arm came from the back office area or the bathroom?
A: The bathroom.
Q: So you had entered into the back office area then?
A: Yeah, I was walking back here. Pushed back there I should say.
Q: Alright, you are saying you were pushed, he is the one who pushed
you into the back office area?
A: Uh huh.
0: Did JoAnn say anything to you at that time?
A: No.
Q: You said that an arm came and pushed you, whose arm was that?
A: The man that was in the bathroom.
0: Alright, and that man was in the bathroom at the time.
A: Oh yes, he was in there.
0: Jo Ann didn't say anything to you?
A: NO
0: Okay, and when you went into the bathroom or were pushed into
the bathroom, where exactly in the bathroom did you go?
A: Where did I go once I got in there?
Q: What part of the bathroom did you go?
A: Uh, he said don't look at me, he said.
Q: Right.
A: Right?
A: And then into the corner I went
Q: Would you Digitized
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A: I am trying to find the bathroom, that is what is difficult.
0: You recognize where the bathroom is?
A: No, I donft really I know it is in the back here.
0: Now, you see in the
A: Right here.
Q: Right. Where is the door to the bathroom?
A: Right here.
Q: Alright, if the whole corner there, the whole box area
is the bathroom, see where it is labeled bathroom. Alright, and
the mark that you just put it is extended out past the red mark.
If that is the swinging door, then
A: This is the door in the bathroom.
0: Alright, let me give you the frame of reference of this drawing.
The person who drew it before said that the door was the black line that
extends out to the first mark you make . Alright, lets assume just in
order to get your testimony correct, lets assume that is the door,
where were you in relation to the door?

Were you behind it , over in

the corner
A: I was in the corner.
0: Alright, show me again where you were.
A: This is the door to the bathroom

here,

- "\ • v •

NB: Your Honor, may I approach the witness to help clarify this.
JUDGE: Why don't you just have her draw a bathroom.
NB: Alright, why don't you just draw the bathroom.
A: Alright very well, now here is the door. Here is where I was,
in this corner.
-148-
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0: Alright, where was Jo Ann as you were in that corner?
A: She was here on the toilet.
Q: She was sitting on the toilet?
A: Yes.
Q: Is there one toilet?
A: Yes, one.
Q: Alright, and was the door closed during that period of time?
A: No. He stood in the doorway.
Q: Were you able to see the tall individual that you have described
during that period of time?
A: No, I din1t even look.
Q: Where was tha person as far as you could tell
A: As far as I know, here was Jo Ann and he was here.
0: There was nothing then that precluded you to have seen that
person in the bathroom.
A: Except for me turning around and having a look.
Q: Alright, you didn't want to look at him?
A: No I didn't
Q: But he was right there in the bathroom?
A: Oh Yes.
Q: Now as he was talking in the bathroom, he was carrying on a
converation with Jo Ann?
A: No.
0: He was talking to the individual out
A: Outside.
Q: Did he move and walk outside of the bathroom?
A: I don1t know.
Q: You don't recall. Did you hear his voice the whole time?
A: Yes.
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A: Yes, he was shouting to the fellow.
Q: Do you think you could recognize that voice again if you
heard it?
A: Oh, I don't know. I really don't know. I hate to say this but
everybody sounds alike.
Q: How long of period of time did you hear him talk to the other
individual?
A: Five or ten minutes, five, something like that.
Q: Was it, how long was it from the time that you were first put
into the bathroom from the time that you said Jo Ann went to pull
the alarm?
A: Oh, twenty minutes maybe, I don't know, time just. I would
say, to me, it seemed like twenty minutes or something like that.
Q: Now, you have described generally that individual that was
back in the bathroom. You said that that person was 5'10" or 5!11".
A: Taller anyway, yeah.
Q: You think the person was tall. Now are you married.
A: Well, I am divorced.
Q: How tall was your husband?
A: 6'2".
Q: Would you say that that individual was as tall as your husband?
A: No.
Q: How much shorter than your husband was he ?
A: He was shorter, that I do know

How many,

I couldn't tell. How

many inches.
Q: Do you think he could have been 6'?
A: Could have been.
Q: Do you recall now what that individual was wearing?
A: No.
O .

\ ~ A
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A: Uh huh.
JUDGE: Now, which individual are we talking about?
NB: We are talking about the individual back in the bathroom.
A: Oh, the one I described was the one up front.
Q: Alright, then I will take you back. We are talking about the
person who was in the bathroom. Now you did say that person was tall.
Right?
A: Yes. Appeared tall.
Q: Very tall?
A: He appeared tall and thin, from what I can gather.
Q: Tall and thin?
A: Yeah.
Q: But you canft recall what that person was wearing?
A: No.
Q: You can recall, though, that the person had on dark glasses?
A: That was the front person.
Q: Alright, now I am just talking about the person in the bathroom.
A: The bathroom, okay.
Q: Do you recall anything else about that person?
A: No.
Q: Not whether they had glasses on, or a hat on.
A: No, when he said don't look at me, I didn't look.
Q: So you didn't look at that person at all, even for a instant?
A: No.
Q: Uh, you have described the gun. Do you know what the barrel
is, the part that points out.
A: Just the end of it, right.
Q: How long would you say, based on your own memory, how long would
you say thatDigitized
barrel
was?W. Hunter
Do Law
you
remember?
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Q: Do you think something pearly was on that gun?
A: It seemed to me to be a white gun, a white front on it. That
was what I was trying to think of. Rather than a metal. But I only
caught a glimpse,

so I don't know.

Q: Now you recall talking to the police officers in this case.
A: Yes.
Q: And you told them exactly what you observed and what you
remembered at the time.
A: Uh huh.
Q: You gave them as much detail as you possibly could at the time
A: Yes I did.
Q: Do you recall telling them anything about the race of the person back
in the bathroom?
A: No.
Q: Nothing ?
A: No.
Q: Do you recall giving them any detail about that person at all.
A: No I don1t.
Q: You did gi'^e them the height though?
A: Oh yes, because that was all I saw.
Q: You looked at some photo arrays?
A: Yes.
Q: How much later after this occurred did you look at the photo
arrays?
A: I am trying to think, maybe a week.
Q: Was it only one time that you looked at a photo array?
A: No twice.
Q: Two different times?
A: Yes.

-
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A: Uh, huh.
Q: When was the second time?
A: My memory, uh, at the end of the week, give or take.
Q: Do you recall who was present when you looked at those photographs?
A: Yes I do.
Q: Alright, who was it?
A: Urn, (inaudible)
Q: Uh huh, anybody else?
A: Oh, I don't think, Ifm not sure if the man was with him or not.
The one with the glasses on. Now,

was alone the second time.

Q: Okay, the first time he was with somone else.
A: Yes, the other man was with him only.
Q: Did they show you those photographs at your home?
A: No.
Q: Where were you?
A: I came outside from

the shop.

Q: Was JoAnn around at the time?
A: No
Q: Were any other people around who saw?
A: No, just me and
Q: Were you able to identify anybody the first time you were showed
a photo array?
A: Not the first time, no.
Q: But the second time you were.
A: Yes.
Q: Can you recall how many pictures were in that photo array the
second time?
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Q: How many pictures were you shown?
PROS: Which time are we talking about, the first or second time?
NB: The second time.
A: Five or six.
Q: Five or six? And how were they shown to you,

were they part

of an evelope, were they just isolated one by one, how were you
shown these pictures?
PROS: It is still the second time you are referring to?
NB: Yes.
A: How was I shown pictures?
Q: Mm hmm. Were they separate pictures?
A: Yeah.
Q: Were they part of an evelope that had a series of different
pictures on it or can you recall?
A: Just one of two, as I recall. A side view and a front view.
Q: Then there were just separate photographs.
A: Right.
Q: Was this at your home or was it again out from your work?
A: I went outside from work.
Q: And what was it that the officer said to you when he showed you
those photographs?
A: He asked if I would be able to recognize anybody after the
display that he got from whatever he called it.
Q: Okay, uh, did the officer talk to you about any suspects
that have been arrested on the case.
A: No.
Q: Did you have any information that some of the jewels had been
recovered at that point.
A: No.
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Q: Had you talked to Joanne about the case since it happened?
A: Meaning what about?
Q: Anything about, surrounding the case, about circumstances
surrounding the case.
A: Oh, just about how we felt basically.
Q: Didn't she tell you that some people had been arrested in
California on the case.
A: Afterwards I think she did, but I don't think before.
Q: So, before you were shown the photo arrays, you had not talked
to Joanne about the fact that people had been arrested in California.
A: I don't recall.
Q: You don't recall or you don't think she did.
A: I don't think so, no, I don't think I did. Because Joanne
wasn't there that much.
Q: Nothing futher.
CROSS EXAMINATION: (Ms. Wells)
Q: Kyarsguaard
A-: Kyarsguaard
Q: Kyarsguaard
A: Uh huh.
Q: I think that is probably why Nancy asked if she could call you
Stella.
A: I think so.
Q: The man that you touched on the shoulder today, how, if any way,
does he appear different to you today he would have appeared in that
store when you saw him.
A: He hasn't got the (inaudible) in the hair.
Q: What else.
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Q: Anything else.
A: He is not dressed the same.
Q: How would you have described the length of his hair on, in
August.
A: About, just, neck length.
Q: I need you to speak up a little bit.
A: Just below the ear.
Q: Now, how about the sides of his hair. How were they. Were they
cut, not cut, or how far did they extend from say the top of the
ear.
A: Ifm not sure I quite understand what you mean there.
Q: Well, on the sides, woere the sides shorter than the back, or
was it all one lenght.
A: Well, he had a hat on, it is difficult to say.
Q: Did the cap cover all of his hair?
A: The cap came down to here and then the hair was down.
Q: Alright, now the part that was down, that is what I am talking
about. What were you able to see as far as hair over his ears.
A: Black hair.
Q: I am talking about the length though.
A: Oh, just

-

Q: They can't pick that up on the recording so...
A: Uh, oh.
Q: Did hair cover his ears?
A: I can't remember.
Q: You have no memory of that at all.
A: Nope.
Q: Now if looking at the man in the middle who has the braids, have
you ever braided
before.
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Q: You know then that it, by raising the hair, it will make it
appear much shorter than it would be if it were loose, correct?
A: Right.
Q: So assuming that this man had his hair unbraided now, would you
expect that his hair would be longer on the sides, long on the sides?
A: Right, it would be longer.
Q: And yet you can't recall seeing any hair.
A: The stocking hat.
Q: ....The proper length, right, over the ears.
A: Well, it wasn't short short like a man would wear, it was longer
A: down, to me, just past the ears. Here.
Q: Alright, now again, are we talking about the sides or are we
talking about the back.
A: We are talking about this view here. This side view.
Q: Did you tell the police officers anything about the length
of his hair?
A: Mm, I probably did, I don1t know.
Q: Do you recall what you told them.
A: It was short hair, longish dark hair.
Q: Your recollection now is that you would have told them that
it was longish-dark hair.
A: Black hair, excuse me, black hair.
Q: Long black hair.
A: Longish black hair, not long.
Q: What would you have told them about the first man's ethenic
background.
A: It was Mexican.
A: What did you tell them about his facial hair.
A: He had a mustache.
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A: Okay, did you tell them how long the mustache might have been
or where it might have come to on his face.
A: I do think I did, yes.
Q: Alright, you do think you told them all that.
A: I think so.
Q: Okay, do you think you could be mistaken about the description
that you gave to the police.
A: No, I don' t.
Q: So it would be your testimony that you didn't give this brief
description. That it was a Mexican male, short, with a mustache.
You would have told them more than that.
A: I told them whatever they asked me. I could remember what, they
asked me what I saw then at the time.
Q: But it is your recollection that you gave them more information
than the fact that he was a Mexican male, short and has a mustache.
A: Yes, I gave them what he was wearing.
Q: What did you tell them he was wearing?
A: I said he was wearing a navy blue suit. A navy blue boiler
suit.
PROS: Excuse me, I didn't hear what kind of a suit it was.
A: A navy blue boiler suit.
Q: Boiler,
A: And apparently here, that is a jump suit,* I don't know.
0: Now did Detective Horiuchi show you a photo spread, did you
say.

Is he the one who did that?

A: Mm Hmm.
Q: And were you shown any pictures from which you took out or
picked the picture of the man you saw in the front. Were you able
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to nick out somebody from that photo spread?

A: Yes.
Q: You were.
A: Yes.
Q: Okay, do you recall how many pictures you were shown.
A: I say about five or six.
Q: Were you shown two groups of pictures, one of what was believed
t20 be the man in front, perhaps one showing the man in back?
A. Well, I didn't know who it was supposed to be.
Q: Okay, you were only shown five pictures total, or were you
shown two groups of pictures.
A: I was shown groups, two different times, two groups.
Q: Now, did you pick out two individuals then.
A: No, I picked just the one.
Q: Just the one.
A: Mm Hmm.
Q: Did the person when he, as you said, grabbed you and pushed you,
was it your impression that he was doing that to facilitate moving
you to the back of the room.
A: Yes.
Q: Alright, not such that those particular acts themselves were
meant to harm you.
A: Oh, I don't quite get what you mean there.
Q: Okay, when you were grabbed and pushed.
A: Uh huh.
Q: Was it your impression at that time that he was doing that in
order to get you to the back of the room.
A: Yes.
Q: Alright, no threats were made to you involving his physically
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A: No, mm mm.
Q: Now the person that you kept hearing the man with the
gun call out to , said that the name he used was MGeorgeM?
A: Yes.
Q: Did that man respond to those calls?
A: No.
Q: Did you hear any other names used.
A: No.
Q: Did you ever hear anyone speak who would have had any type of a
foreign accent that you recognized.
A: Well, no, not really.
Q: When the man pushed you, grabbed you and pushed you, was he to the
back of you, I assume, since he was using a pushing motion.
A: Yes.
Q: So you didn't have the total amount of time that you were with
him when you were able to actually observe his face, is that right?
As he is pushing you from the back, you can't see his face can you?
A: No, correct.
Q: And how long did it take to get you from the place that he
grabbed your arm and began to push you until you lost contact
with him.
A: Well, it was so quick, maybe two or three minutes.
Q: It took two or three minutes to walk.
A: I don't know, I am only assuming that.
Q: Do you have a watch on ?
A: No, I don't. It was only a couple of seconds but it seemed
like three minutes.
Q: Okay, that is what I want you to think about and perhaps if
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T/nn 1 nnl< nn there at the clock and vou see that second hand going

around, okay, when it gets to the nine I am going to say start and
then I want you to say stop when the amount of time has gone by
that it took you to be pushed into the back. From the time of
contact to the back room.
I missed the nine so we will go to the 12.
A: About now.
Q: Okay now.
A: It was three seconds there.
Q: Okay, now, do you revise your earlier estimates then.
A: Oh, yes.
Q: Okay, so it was not a matter of two or three minutes that it
took to push you back but a matter of maybe two or three seconds.
A: Probably.
Q: Okay, which means that you had, not a very long time, in which
to observe him at all.
A: Long enough.
Q: Okay, My question is that you didn't have a very long period
of time.
A: No. I didn't have a long time.
Q: Alright, And some of that time was with him behind you.
A: Yes.
Q: Let me show you what has been marked as State's Exhibit
P21A and P21C and ask if you can familiarize yourself with the
individual in those pictures who is wearing a blue T-shirt.
A: No.
Q: Well, I'm not asking you to identify the person, I am just
asking you to familiarize yourself with the pictures.
A: Okay.
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and then looking at the man who is seated in the middle that
that is the same person or not.
A: No.
Q: It is not.
A: I wouldn't say so.
Q: Alright, and what can you, other than the hair, being in
braids, or not being in braids, what do you articulate as the
difference between the person pictured in that picture and the man
seated in the middle.
A: Well, his nose looks different.
Q: The nose looks different?
A: It looks different to me.
Q: How is it different?
A: Oh, it is a bit more. That nose is a little bit more crooked,
if that is the word I want to use.
Q: Okay, the person in the picture's nose is crooked.
A: Okay, The mouth is different.

,

Q: The mouth is different.
A: Mm hmm. And the mustache looks different.
Q: How is the mustache different.
A: His is all here, cut here.
Q: Which one are you talking about, which one, are you describing
the gentleman in the middle here.
A: Yes, it goes all the way across and this one curves here and
goes like that.
Q: That is going to be hard for the record to pick that up.
Okay, but it is your testimony that you do not believe that this
is the same man as that one.
1
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Q: Now, looking at that person again, is that, could that have
been the person that came into your store and that you have
identified as being the man who pushed you into the back.
A: No, I donTt think so.
Q: You are sure of that.
MAY THE RECORD REFLECT THAT THE WITNESS HAS REFERRED TO THE
EXHIBITS P21A AND P21C.
Q: Was that picture ever, or a picture of that man ever submitted
to you within the group of pictures that Detective Horiuchi presented to you.
A: Oh, I couldnft tell you.
PROS.

I!m sorry I couldn't hear that answer.

A: I couln't tell you. I mean there are so many, I mean there
was you know.
Q: So you donft think you have ever seen another picture of that
person before.
A: I could have, it could have been, but not the same.
Q: Do you think those two persons resemble one another?
A: No I don1t.
Q: You don't
A: No.
Q: Would you be surprised if someone were to tell you that they
were related?
A: (laugh) Not really.
Q: Alright, and why is that? Because they look enough alike that
they may be related?
A: It is hard to say , I mean.
Q: Well, okay, my question to you was if you would be suprised
if they wereDigitized
related
and you said no.
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Q i i r n r i cz&cl

Q: Why, Why would that not
A: Because of (inaudible) and a brother, or.
Q: Are you basing that though on the physical resemblance
between the two of them?
A: No.
Q: What are you basing that on, then.
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I N S T R U C T I O N NO

• 3L

One of the important issues in this case is the identificatior
of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.

The State has

the burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonable doubt.

It

is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as
to the correctness of his statement.

However, you, the jury,

must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the
identification of the defendant before you may convict him.

If

you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant
not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness.

Its value depends on the opportunity the

witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense, in
order to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you
should consider the following:
L.

Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and

adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe
the offender at the time of the offense will be affected by such
matters as how long or short a time was available, how far or close
the witness was, how good were the lighting conditions, whether
the witness had an opportunity to see or know the person in the

past.

J
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In connection with this, you may consider the fact, if such

-i

j, has been shown to you, that the witness has failed to identify
ii
ii

;j the defendant on prior occasions or has identified another person
•j instead of the defendant on prior occasions.
!|-

;

2.

Are you satisfied that the identification made by the

!j
'! witness was the product of his own recollection?

it
You may take into account both the strength of the identifij;

ji cation, and the circumstances under which the identification was
limade.

If the identification by the witness may have been influ-

! 1
i i

j ( enced by the circumstances under which the defendant was presented
,; to him for identification, you should scrutinize the identification
. with great care. You may also consider the length of time that
lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity
of the witness to see the defendant, as a factor bearing on the
reliability of the identification.
;

It is again to be emphasized that the burden of proof on the
prosecutor extends to every element of the crime charged, and this

j specif ically includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable"""^
doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime
• I with which he stands charged.

If after examining the testimony,

,; you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identifical tion, you must find the defendant not guilty.
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fISTtA** rpnNT*.UTAH
BROOKE C. WELLS ( # 3 4 2 1 )
Attorney for Defendant
flfC
l l 2> 3 8 1 1 ^ * ^
S a l t Lake L e g a l Defender A s s o c i a t i o n * *
333 S o u t h S e c o n d E a s t
fLOlXOtt «l»ltLr • 'CLERK
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
^ J M DISL cjyST
Telephone:
5 3 2 - 5 444

rfr^^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS II
AND III OF AMENDED INFORMATION

Plaintiff
-vPAUL ANTHONY BRANCH,

Case No. CR-84-1266
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant

COMES NOW, the Defendant, PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH, by and
through his attorney of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, and moves this
Court for an Order dismissing Count II, Aggravated Assault, and
Count III, Theft, of the Amended Information.

The Motion is made

for the reason that Aggravated Assault and Theft are lesser
included offenses of the crime of Aggravated Robbery.

Inclusion

of these Counts in the Information if presented to the jury will
prejudice the Defendant and deny him the right to a fair trial
as guaranteed by the U.S. and Utah Constitutions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th^s ^£&

day of December, 1984.

\Q^W4JL
BROOKE C, WELLS
Attorney for Defendant
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DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this j \

day of December, 1984.

\X^A

Mk

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Joseph
Fratto, Jr. 431 South 300 East, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah
this O- I day of December, 1984.

UAl
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Edward
Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, this /)\
of December, 1984.

wJBM-
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RULE 3.6. PLEAS OF GUILTY
(a) AdmoaJUoaj to Defeadaat.
<b) Deftraiaiag Whether (IK Plea is VohiaUry.
(c) DelenaJaJag FactvaJ Basil for Pie*.
(d) Vm pf Affidavit of Defeadaat.

Upon entry of a plea of guilty to a criminal
charge, before acceptance thereof, there must be
substantial compliance with the following:
(a) Admonitions to Defendant.
The Court shall not accept a plea of guilty
without first making certain that the defendant understands the following:
'
. • - • , .- »')' •
(1) The nature of the charge.
(2) The minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty
to which the defendant may be subjected, including
any consecutive sentences, if given;
(3) That the defendant has the right to plead not
guilty, or to persist in that plea if it has already
been made, or to plead guilty; and
(4) That if he pleads guilty there will not be a
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty he
waives the right to a trial by jury, the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, the right
against self incrimination, and the right to appeal a
conviction.
(b) Determining Whether the Plea is Voluntary.
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty
without first determining that the plea is voluntary.
If the tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement, the agreement shall be stated and confirmed in
open court. The court shall determine whether, any
force of threats or any promises, apart from a plea
agreement, were used to obtain the plea. .••(c) Determining Factual Basis for Plea.
The court shall not enter final judgment on a plea
of guilty without first determining that there is a
factual basis for the plea, and that all requirements
of law for acceptance of a guilty plea have been
met.

. - »..

:•..•.-..

(d) Use of Affidavit of Defendant.
The Court may establish the foregoing requirements in the record by use of a written affidavit
executed by the defendant before the court, the
substance of which shall be in substantially the
form as contained in the "Affidavit of Defendant"
form.
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